

**Are The Relationships Between Junior and Senior Leaders In The U.S.
Army Officer Corps Dysfunctional?**

A MONOGRAPH

BY

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Second Term AY 00-01

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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title of Monograph: *Are The Relationships Between Junior and Senior Officers
In The U.S. Army Officer Corps Dysfunctional?*

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Abstract

ARE THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN JUNIOR AND SENIOR LEADERS IN THE U.S. ARMY OFFICER CORPS DYSFUNCTIONAL? By MAJ Anneliese M. Steele, USA, 69 pages.

This monograph examined the relationship between junior and senior U.S. Army officers. In 2000, Thomas, E. Ricks, a reporter for the *Washington Post*, wrote an article contending that there was a rift between the junior and senior leaders in the U.S. Army officer corps. The reporter shared the details of some of the more shocking remarks made by these students attending the Command and General Staff College, about their senior leaders, that did not cast them in a positive light. The overriding theme was that there is no trust in the senior leadership. After this news release, many in the officer corps began to openly ask if there was a tension between junior and senior officers in the military. These events sparked internal reflection by the Army and its leadership in 2000 by senior members of the officer corps. The United States Army War College Strategic Studies Institute even listed “Improving Junior Officer Confidence in Senior Officer Leadership” as a critical potential research topic for officers.

This is a very relational topic that required exploration into the dimensions of fostering trust. Trust directly leads to confidence. Distrust destroys confidence. The key to improving confidence between these different levels of leaders is predicated on the functionality of the relationships between them. Functional relationships have distinctive characteristics, which are critical to the establishment of trust among members of a community. A functional command climate is one, which 1) exhibits an attitude of service, 2) fosters trust through effective communication, 3) exhibits senior leaders who teach and train, 4) exhibits senior leaders who are caring leaders, and 5) junior leaders who honor and obey senior leaders. These are the criteria the author used to answer the research question “are the relationships between junior and senior leaders in the U.S. Army officer corps dysfunctional?” The author explored the environment of the junior and senior leaders and assessed if these characteristics were present.

This monograph began with an historical examination of relational trends found in the U.S. Army officer corps from 1970 to 2000 in order to determine if the problems identified in surveys in 2000 were new problems or part of a continuing trend. The monograph discussed the characteristics of functional relationships and techniques leaders can use to create functional environments. These concepts were applied to an analysis of the present climate between junior and senior leaders based on input from survey comments made by junior officers in 2000. The monograph assessed general trends and found overall, relationships between junior and senior leaders were dysfunctional. There are senior leaders out in the U.S. Army who demonstrated functional characteristics. These leaders appeared to be the exception as opposed to the norm. This research paper ended with conclusions and recommendations for the future.

Only strong, healthy and functional command climates can help steer the Army officer corps through the uncertain future that stands before this nation. In order to create an environment where functional relationships are possible between junior and senior leaders the U.S. Army must make significant changes to the present personnel management systems, including reexamining the officer evaluation system and the present up or out promotion policy. Other recommendations include sensitizing senior leaders to the interpersonal skills necessary to achieve functional relationships. Senior leaders must commit to reversing the present thirty-year trend by eliminating systems, which encourage dysfunctional behavior, reward behavior in leaders that fosters functional characteristics and consciously exhibit functional characteristics at their level of influence. If senior leaders intentionally strive to reverse the present paradigms in the U.S. Army, the relationships between officers will improve and the U.S. Army will reap the benefit of greater creativity and commitment across the officer corps.

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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

CHAPTER 1

In 2000, Thomas E. Ricks, a reporter for the *Washington Post*, wrote an article contending that there was a rift between the junior and senior leaders in the U.S. Army officer corps.¹ The basis of this report was information leaked by electronic mail from an officer who had access to the compiled results of a survey administered to 760 students attending the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the Army's mid-career service school, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The survey solicited the CGSC students for their views on Army leadership. These students represent the top fifty percent of the junior officer corps for their respective year groups. Department of the Army boards, comprised of senior leaders, specially selected these students. There will be a few members of every CGSC class, who will have the privilege of leading the U.S. Army, in the future, at the highest levels. The majority of those attending CGSC are career Army officers. Generally those officers who attend CGSC desire to continue service with the military. Negative comments originating from this particular set of young officers leaves cause for concern.

The reporter shared the details of some of the more shocking remarks made by these students, about their senior leaders, that did not cast them in a positive light. "The overriding theme is that there is no trust in the senior leadership."² For example, the article quoted a student's assessment that "senior leaders will throw subordinates under the bus in a heart beat to protect or advance their career."³ After this news release, many in the officer corps began to openly ask if there was a tension between junior and senior officers in the military. These events sparked internal reflection by the Army and its leadership in 2000 by senior members of the officer corps. The United States Army War College Strategic Studies Institute even listed "Improving Junior Officer Confidence in Senior Officer Leadership"⁴ as a critical potential research topic for officers.

This is a very relational topic that requires exploration into the dimensions of fostering trust. Trust directly leads to confidence. Distrust destroys confidence. The key to improving confidence between these different levels of leaders is predicated on the functionality of the relationships between them. Functional relationships have distinctive characteristics, which are critical to the establishment of trust among members of a community.

People are part of a community. Where there is leadership, there is a team, a family, a unity. Even people who do not especially like each other feel the sense of community. When Neal Armstrong talks about the Apollo explorations, he describes how a team carried out an almost unimaginably complex set of interdependent tasks. Until there were women astronauts, the men referred to this feeling as “brotherhood.” I suggest they rename it “family.”⁵

In this context, the Army officer corps is in many ways similar to a family. Senior officers guide and pass over to the younger generations the leadership of this organization. Trust and confidence therefore are relational issues.

Management always lives, works, and practices in and for an institution. And an institution is a human community held together by the bond, next to the tie of family, is the most powerful human bond: the work bond.⁶

The U.S. Army officer corps is an institution, a human community held together by bonds and is part of a bigger institution, the U.S. Army. The officer corps establishes the direction and leadership that shapes the destiny of the U.S. Army. The officer corps has the responsibility to develop competent, committed and ethical leaders for the future capable of sustaining land combat, if called upon by this nation.

This study defines senior leaders as those members of the officer corps in the rank of lieutenant colonel and above. As senior leaders, one can best impact those who are the primary leaders of the units in their organizations and members of their staffs. The senior leaders in the U.S. Army should strive to leave a lasting legacy of their leadership in the military. They should pass on their leadership to those who would follow behind them, to ensure the future has promise. This type of leadership establishes legacies that are measured one junior officer at a time. Senior leaders should seek to establish a legacy of functional leadership that will prepare competent leaders for tomorrow, in much the same way as parents have the responsibility to train children to succeed personally and professionally in the future. The relationship between the junior and senior leaders must be one of functionality. The officer corps will disintegrate, and with it, the future leadership of our nation’s Army, if the officers in the Army cannot build relationships that are functional. Army doctrine directs Army officers to develop interpersonal skills that foster trust and will maximize the most essential element of combat power, leadership.⁷

FM (Field Manual) 3-0, Operations, establishes the Army’s keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations. The concept of soldiers and leadership is encapsulated in a quote found in *FM 3-0* written by an anonymous soldier in the *Infantry Journal* in 1948. “No man is a leader until his appointment is ratified

in the minds and hearts of his men.”⁸ Senior leaders cannot win the hearts and minds of junior leaders in an environment that ignores the emotions and thoughts of those one leads. FM 3-0 states that leadership is one of the elements of combat power.

Because it focuses directly on soldiers, leadership is the most essential dynamic of combat power.... The duty of every leader is to be competent in the profession of arms. Competence requires four sets of skills: *interpersonal*, conceptual, technical and tactical. Army leaders hone these skills through continual training and self-study.⁹

This monograph provides an opportunity for the author and the readers to conduct increased self-study on interpersonal skills. The interpersonal skills examined are those that are proven outside a military environment to be effective for leaders of a human community held together by relational bonds. Additionally, the interpersonal skills studied in this monograph are those that are proven to foster functional relationships between different generations.

The monograph will follow the framework of characteristics of functional relationships, as outlined by Dr. Gary Chapman, in his book *Five Signs of a Functional Family*.¹⁰ Dr. Chapman has helped people professionally with family struggles for over twenty-five years. Through observation and experience he concluded that when relationships are not functional, they fail to

produce greater happiness, meaning or freedom for the experimenters, and it does not produce a generation with greater creativity, fewer emotional problems and more fulfillment. The opposite has been true. The experimenters fade from the scene, and the new generation is left without a compass in a vast world of unhappiness.¹¹

In his book, Dr. Chapman contends that individuals do not create a family. A family is made up of multiple members working as a unit.¹² In Dr. Chapman’s book, the father of a family is viewed as the appointed head of his family. The book outlines patterns a father can use to lead his family to create an environment in which relationships can be functional.

Family relationships vary slightly from the relationship between junior and senior leaders. For instance, a family relationship is of a permanent nature and does not change. Relationships between junior and senior leaders are of a more temporary nature, often changing every one to two years. However, there are aspects of the dynamics found in a family relationship, such as interpersonal skills, that are applicable to the military environment. Since the Army officer corps is an institution of humans knitted together by bonds, the concept of functionality, as applied to the military environment can then be a beneficial model

Army officers can use to improve the level of trust between junior and senior leaders. Chapman's concepts help teach one how to build common bonds and solid relationships from the perspective of a leader.

In the organizational world, successful leaders are those who know how to find the common bonds and build solid relationships. James Autry, a successful Fortune 500 executive, told us that "business is better when...relationships are better, whether they are customers, vendors or employees.... relationships are built on reaching people as people, not as digits."¹³ Leadership must be caring and supportive. Leaders should view themselves as members of a helping profession. Dr. Chapman's model therefore is a good model to start with in determining how to build functional relationships between military officers. The key to the development of trust and confidence is the establishment of functional relationships between junior and senior leaders in the Army.

This monograph will outline the five characteristics of functional relationships as presented by Dr. Chapman, partially modified to suit the dynamics of the organizational relationships between junior and senior Army officers. Dr. Chapman contends that in order to set on a course of developing a healthy functional environment, it helps to be able to distinguish the authentic from the counterfeit. The only way to do this is to establish what the authentic is and then seek to implement it. Dr. Chapman exclaims in his book "there is a desperate need for a new model. What does ...healthy ... look like?"¹⁴ One cannot create a healthy relationship until a clear picture of one exists. In order to make an assessment of relationships, the assessor must first understand the characteristics of functional relationships. This understanding was applied to an analysis of the dynamics of the relationships between junior and senior leaders in the Army officer corps. When compared against a healthy model, unhealthy habits become evident. An analysis provides a tool to address dysfunctional relationships and results in lessons learned that could help improve the relationships between junior and senior officers in the U.S. Army. One limitation of this study is that there is a variance in leadership actions throughout the army. This study made assessments based on general trends, as reflected by collective feedback received from junior officers. The intent of this monograph is not to place blame on junior or senior leadership but simply to explore the possibilities in changes that can be made to facilitate an increased level of trust between the officer ranks.

This monograph attempted to break away from the cognitive realm of theory and explored the relational human dimensions of the interactions between Army junior and senior officers. The author

looked at a number of sources, which record and analyze the perceptions of junior leaders and articles written by a number of senior leaders to get a feel for the intellectual and emotional discourse occurring between them. The author also examined the army culture and relied upon an experience base of thirteen years in service in the role of a junior leader. The overall trends found in these sources were compared against the characteristics of functional communities.

A functional command climate is one, which 1) exhibits an attitude of service, 2) fosters trust through effective communication, 3) exhibits senior leaders who teach and train, 4) exhibits senior leaders who are caring leaders, and 5) exhibits junior leaders who honor and obey senior leaders.¹⁵ These are the criteria the author used to answer the research question “are the relationships between junior and senior leaders in the U.S. Army officer corps dysfunctional?” The author explored the environment of the junior and senior leaders and assessed if these characteristics were present. If these characteristics were present, the relationships in the officer corps were deemed functional. If these characteristics were lacking, relationships in the U.S. officer corps were deemed dysfunctional. Only strong, healthy and functional command climates can help steer the Army officer corps through the uncertain future that stands before this nation.

An environment of functionality is key and senior commanders and leaders must establish functional climates in the U.S. Army. This monograph begins with an historical examination of relational trends found in the U.S. Army officer corps from 1970 to 2000 in order to determine if the problems identified in surveys in 2000 are new problems or part of a continuing trend. Following this, the monograph discusses the characteristics of functional relationships and applies these concepts to an analysis of the present climate between junior and senior leaders based on input from survey comments made by junior officers in 2000. The monograph ends by determining if the relationship between junior and senior leaders is dysfunctional and draws conclusions and recommendations for the future. An historical examination of relational trends found in the U.S. Army officer's corps over the past thirty years follows.

HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF RELATIONAL TRENDS OF THE U.S. ARMY OFFICER CORPS FROM 1970 TO 2000

CHAPTER 2

A study of the U.S. Army Officer corps must involve an examination of the past prior to completing an analysis of the present. This gives perspective over time on the perceived leadership problem identified in 2000 between junior and senior leaders. Strictly analyzing the relationships in the officer corps at one time and place would prevent the reader from gaining a long-term perspective. Perspective is important when analyzing the interactions between members of a community.

The initial question the author sought to answer in this chapter was “is the perceived crisis in leadership something new to the Army or is it part of a continuing trend?” An historical analysis became necessary to determine this. The 1970s timeframe is meaningful because this is when the U.S. Army transitioned from the draft army to a volunteer army. The author assumed that this significant change might alter leadership requirements and result in new demands on leadership that a draft army did not. An historical look will be valuable in uncovering systems induced dysfunctionality as opposed to individual leader induced problems.

Following this study, the author can then examine the criteria of functional command climates and make a determination on overall functionality or dysfunctionality of the relationship between junior and senior leaders in 2000. If there were similar problems across the last thirty years, this would suggest the problem is bigger than the current generation of leaders. If there were no trends seen across this span of time, then the problem is uniquely confined to the period of the 1990s and is not linked to the past. What did the relationships in the 1970s show?

An interest in assessing the leadership climate began in the 1970s following the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War. As a result of the My Lai massacre, General William Westmoreland directed *A Study on Military Professionalism* on 18 April 1970 for release in July of 1970.¹⁶ A team of officers at the War College interviewed 450 officers ranging from the grade of captain to lieutenant colonel. A number of conclusions came out of this study.

Some conclusions give evidence of a climate between junior and senior leaders that contributed to great dissatisfaction and disillusionment on the part of the junior leader. Creativity was stifled. These are signs of relationships that were not functional. There was a perception that the U.S. Army was relying heavily on statistics and numbers to assess an officer’s potential for promotion. Ratings relied on statistical numbers.

“An Army whose officer corps professed allegiance to the ideals of duty, honor, and country had somehow seen them twisted into me, ... and my career.”¹⁷ The comments in this report were very reflective of comments made by junior officers in 2000.

Junior officers did not think they could get promoted unless they were willing to be dishonest and falsify reports. The climate of the army is conducive to self-deception because it fosters the production of inaccurate information; it impacts on the long-term ability of the Army to fight and win because it frustrates young, idealistic, energetic officers who leave the service and are replaced by those who will tolerate if not condone, ethical imperfection...It stifles initiative, innovation, and humility because it demands perfection or the pose of perfection at every turn.¹⁸

“The study...had shown beyond doubt that many officers had lost faith in the leadership at the top.”¹⁹ The report ended with thirty-one recommendations for improvement.

The recommendations were specific. Some more notable recommendations included: changing the career pattern of officers, lengthening command tours to reduce ticket-punching, reforming the personal management system, instituting centralized command selection and promotion boards to eliminate nepotism, introducing courses on professional ethics and interpersonal communications at service schools, reconsidering the system captivated with a fixation of measuring performance with statistics, and eliminating a zero-defect mentality which was stifling learning and initiative because mistakes were not tolerated. The Army senior leadership decided to use the Army school system as the major tool to fix the problem.²⁰

According to the study, the Army was hesitant to admit faults, so the first step was to inform the officer corps of the results of the study to sensitize senior leaders and assure the junior leaders, the future of the organization, that the Army was committed to improving the situation. Unfortunately, the results of this study were withheld for a number of years and distrust grew. Most officers were never aware the study even existed. Concurrently, General Westmoreland directed another study.²¹

This concurrent study, called *Leadership for the 1970s* was released in 1971. In this study, the United States Army War College focused on determining if the present Army's concept of leadership was valid for the future of the army. The study sought to answer the question, “what kind of leadership is appropriate for a modern volunteer army, to what extent will existing principles meet requirements?”²²

Overall the study determined the army leadership principles and the values they represent were still valid for the 1970s. The study noted the level of satisfaction with overall army leaders varied by grade.²³

The higher the officer's grade, the more satisfied one tended to be. The report is best summarized with these words.

Almost without fail, when professionals talk about professionalism, there is a recurring theme of the "ambitious, transitory commander—marginally skilled in the complexities of his duties—engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of his subordinates." This recurring theme was brought to light more than a year ago in a study of officer values.²⁴

This last sentence refers to the *Study on Military Professionalism* mentioned above. These words were used to summarize both studies.²⁵ What were the more important conclusions drawn in the *Leadership for the 1970s Study*?

A number of conclusions and recommendations were made in the *Leadership for the 1970s Study*. The study stated "the significance of the concept of leadership climate is strongly supported by extensive research which shows conclusively that the attitudes and values of those at the upper level permeate the entire organization, filtering down to subordinate levels...if you want to do anything about leadership problems, ...start at the top."²⁶ The study also emphasized ensuring that more instructors in the Army school system had formal training in the behavioral sciences. Unfortunately, this study lost central focus until another crisis erupted.

In 1973, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton Abrams, had a surprise. This surprise bears incredible resemblance to the situation facing the Chief of Staff of the Army in 2000. In the quote shown, General Abrams is speaking to Colonel Mike Malone, a permanent faculty member at the Army War College.

"Malone, what...is happening out there!"...Abrams barked into the telephone, and was initially met with silence...Specifically, Abrams was referring to what was happening at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. What was happening was that the service was reeling on nearly all fronts, or in the words of an internal analysis conducted by the BDM Corporation at the behest of the Pentagon, the Army was "close to losing its pride, heart, and soul and therefore [its combat effectiveness]." Most recently, Abrams was hearing complaints from a number of general officers who had been invited to attend a little soul-searching session on professional ethics and integrity with the students at Leavenworth, where midlevel officers are groomed for command staff jobs. The generals had come away stunned by the intensity with which the students reviled the present system and its "careerism," and by direct association apparently the generals whose careers it had most notably advanced.²⁷

A major contributor to the careerism present in the Army officer corps appears to be the promotion system and the measures of success in the officer corps. Senior officers used the Officer Evaluation Report (OER) as a means of recording the performance and potential of an officer. During this time period, an active duty Colonel wrote of the OER (Officer Evaluation Report), “it provides no guidance to the rated officer on how he is doing or what areas he should improve.... There is not doubt that something must be done to rid ourselves of an abasing, dysfunctional system.”²⁸ Junior leaders were making similar contentions.

In 1981, Cincinnatus, a pen name used for an officer presently serving as a major in the U.S. Army, wrote a book about the Army. Cincinnatus stated that “the doldrums of bureaucracy, careerism and opportunism...have plagued”²⁹ the Army for a long time. One reason identified is the lack of an officer-efficiency report (OER) that does not lend itself to an honest description of performance. Cincinnatus contended that officers were unable to demonstrate initiative, receive critiques, and learn from mistakes without fearing one bad OER could destroy a career.³⁰ Cincinnatus goes on to say, the “very psychological basis of the army system must be altered.”³¹ The writer commends the new OER proposal made in the early 1980s, which has narratives instead of numerical scores, as a step in the right direction.³² The author described the dysfunctional officer climate of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

It was a climate of misinformation and deceit, of scheming, of disintegration and decay of officer professionalism, of internal doubts and disorder, of misused officer efficiency reports, of faltering trust of superiors toward their subordinates and suspicion of higher-ranking officers by those below them...Ticket-punching procedures, zero defects, and a “can do” spirit became more important than duty and honor.³³

The next step in this case study is an examination of the officer corps in the 1980s. The titles of the literature written during this time addressing the state of the officer corps are revealing. Titles included: *The Spit-Shine Syndrome Organizational Irrationality in the American Field Army*³⁴; *Military Incompetence*³⁵; “Where Have All The Warriors Gone?”³⁶; “So Many Officers, So Little to Do”³⁷; “Is Our Military Incompetent?”³⁸; “Men of Character, Principles of Honor?”³⁹; and “The OER Cudgel: Radical Surgery Needed.”⁴⁰ Verbal cries of concern were hitting the printing presses. What were the senior leaders saying?

In 1985, an article entitled, “Where Have All The Warriors Gone?” appeared in the publication *The Washingtonian* and was written by Nick Kotz. This article quoted a number of active duty and retired

senior leaders across the services. Key Army leaders were quoted. General Edward C. Meyer, U.S. Army (Retired) former Army chief of staff stated there was “a focus on the part of the officer corps toward personal gain, as opposed to a selflessness that ...was essential.”⁴¹ Meyers goes on to explain, that the “focus was brought about through policies and procedures that encouraged ticket punching and quick success, to the exclusion of values and principles.”⁴² Meyers released the *Military Professionalism Study*, and attempted to extend the length of command tours to three years and develop “cohort units” where troops stayed together for a long time.⁴³ These initiatives died under institutional pressure. The more traditional view of keeping command tours short so many officers can complete command overrode the initiatives. Many officers interviewed by the research team supporting the article mentioned common problems.

- A promotion system that frequently does not reward the most promising officers, those with the seasoning and potential to be the best combat leaders.
- The loss of too many good officers, particularly those with skills as...combat leaders, who leave out of weariness with the system’s failures or who are forced out prematurely because they are not promoted.
- A system that places too much emphasis on details of managers and bureaucracy, and too little on developing combat effectiveness in officers and their troops.
- Officers driven more by personal ambition than by service to the nation, mission, and their own troops.
- A highly political system of military procurement that poisons the well of leadership, discouraging officers from giving candid assessments of which weapons they need, and how well they work.⁴⁴

Army Lieutenant General Jack Merritt, director, Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked, “The Army needs to look at the whole system of promotions.”⁴⁵ Kotz’s analysis was that the system stresses one set of ideals but “emphasizes “less worthy aims” then the traditional military values of leadership, honor, technical and tactical competence, and caring for one’s troops.”⁴⁶ One of those aims was “careerism.”

A rigid “up or out” system keeps the officer corps young and gets rid of marginal performers. One disadvantage is that it tends to have a cloning effect. In peacetime this works well, but in war, the unorthodox, creative, and original mavericks are in high demand. The present system ensures “officers learn that the more impressive their credentials and the faster they accumulate them-the more “punches” in their “tickets”-the greater their chances of promotion.”⁴⁷ Officer turn over is high and it hurts unit cohesion and causes constant retraining.⁴⁸ According to the article by Kotz, the “ticket punching” is

common to all services. Careerism creates an officer with a view of oneself as an “isolated, self-interested individual whose link to his unit-the most life-sustaining bond of combat-is tenuous at best.”⁴⁹ Does this lead to honorable officers?

In the article “Men of Character, Principle of Honor?” Colonel William Boyd, U.S. Army (retired), shared reflections based on observations made over thirty years of service. Colonel Boyd assures the reader that “in many ways, the Army is better today [September 1985].”⁵⁰ Yet Boyd goes on to discuss behavior observed that is disconcerting. Boyd identified critical problems such as rampant careerism, unbridled ambitions for promotion, and lack of selfless service and commitment. Officers rationalize that what is good for their career is good for the army. A senior leader confessed to Colonel Boyd’s war college class that what was taught was how to impress the boss, not how to be a brigade commander.⁵¹ Boyd says “can a system that has institutionalized unethical practices expect its people, who have to work in such a system, not to conduct themselves accordingly in their dealings with the Army as an institution and with their fellow human beings?”⁵² Boyd contends that the OER is used as a motivation tool instead of a discrimination tool between capabilities and potentials of different officers. The OER must become a tool for the Army, not a ticket for the officer.

Some leaders suggest cures to careerism. Colonel Harry Summers Jr. suggested the Army “create an environment where careerism serves the needs of the nation.”⁵³ Summers goes on to say “The superior man does what’s right; the lesser man does what pays. Since almost all of us are lesser men, what we need is a structure, a system where what’s important pays.”⁵⁴ One cannot overlook the fact that as officers mature, their families grow and they come to depend on this profession for their livelihood. Summers goes on to say that the Army has institutionalized a system that measures success by promotion and that not everyone can be promoted. The Army needs to develop rewards in addition to promotion.

Senior leaders, interviewed by Nick Kotz spoke about two areas of concern, the “zero-defect syndrome”, and lack of risk taking. Lieutenant General Julius Becton, U.S. Army (retired) stated “across the board, the system does not promote risk-takers.... We need a climate that allows new ideas to flourish and we must understand that people are not perfect.”⁵⁵ Army Lieutenant General Jack Meritt contends that the zero-defect syndrome is “ridiculous and abhorrent.”⁵⁶ Some failures result from stupidity and some failures result from innovation. Leaders need to learn how to tell the difference. Over-inflated efficiency

reports contribute to this. The army must get rid of them.⁵⁷ Do the internal survey results in the 1980s match the perceptions of these senior leaders?

The results of internal army surveys between 1984 and 1985 suggested that there were serious concerns about the Army's senior leaders. One survey was conducted at the request of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General John A. Wickham. This survey was not well publicized. The individuals surveyed included 436 serving general officers. They had forty-eight hours to fill it out and received guidance directing them to give candid responses. Additionally, 14,046 lieutenants responded to a poll sent out in summer of 1984.⁵⁸ The results were expressive.

80% said that the "officers with whom they work exemplify the warrior spirit," but 49% said that "the bold, original, creative officer cannot survive in today's army." Of the non-generals (commissioned officers) surveyed, 68% agreed with the premise that "the officer corps is focused on personal gain rather than selflessness;" only 33% of the generals agreed with that statement.⁵⁹

The survey stated, "senior Army leaders behave too much like corporate executives and not like warriors."⁶⁰ Interestingly enough, these survey results were "quickly leaked to the *Armed Forces Journal International*."⁶¹ The *Armed Forces Journal International*, like the article in the Washington Post in 2000, highlighted the more negative comments but included this quote.

Most officers surveyed identified the "battalion commander as having played the biggest role in shaping professional military values." Company commanders were listed second, instructors last: 87% said that non-commissioned officers played a significant role in their development as officers.⁶²

The article went on to discuss how junior leaders expressed the desire for a more mentoring style type leadership from senior leaders. One change that came as a result of this was the development of the Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS³) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The mentor style leadership was fundamental to the course development. "A former battalion commander teaches a small, 10 to 12 person group...developing a mentor relationship with them."⁶³

The relationship between junior and senior leaders appeared to struggle with the absence of functional characteristics all the way through the 1970s and 1980s. The 1970s clearly was a severely dysfunctional period. There was evidence that the Army improved in the 1980s, but the improvement was not significant enough to totally remove the dysfunctional characteristics. The extensive concerns expressed by multiple senior leaders in the 1980s gave significant cause for alarm. These senior leaders benefited from the very

system that they perceived there were faults with. All the observations in the case study to this point were written prior to the nation's great military success, Operation Desert Storm. Had the perceptions changed significantly in the years following the Gulf War?

In June of 1994, the U.S. Army Research Institute published *Perceptions of Army Officers in a Changing Army Research Report*. The observations of this report identified that the percentage of junior officers from 1988 to 1992 that thought the Army would protect their benefits dropped from eighty-eight percent to forty-seven percent. The perception of job security dropped from sixty-three percent to forty percent. Officers exhibited an increased concern over the impact of manpower changes and congressional budget cuts on officer's careers. This survey occurred concurrently with the military draw down. The amount of officer confidence in their promotions and assignments also decreased and thirty-three percent of junior officers surveyed indicated high job stress. The report concluded that senior officers need to continue with these longitudinal research surveys as a means to keep a feel for the "pulse" of the officer corps and effectively evaluate the impact of event and policy changes on junior officers.⁶⁴ The studies continue on a more frequent basis. From 1996 until the present, the amount of reports, articles and research papers covering junior officer perceptions of senior officers is astounding.

The first report that grabs an officer's attention is one discussed by General Dennis Reimer, the Chief of Staff of the Army in 1996. General Reimer had recently received a command climate assessment conducted in 1995 assessing the "state of ethical conduct is abysmal. Battalion commanders cannot afford to tell the truth in a zero defect environment. Telling the truth is viewed as a potential career ender. There is a return to the "zero-defects" and ticket-punching mentality of the 1960s and 1970s."⁶⁵ Soldiers viewed the Army as a "zero defects organization."⁶⁶

Another Longitudinal Research Study was published in July 1996. Officers, predominately junior officers, no longer saw the Army as a legitimate long-term career option. The general perception was that there is a zero-defect environment and the current Army promotion timeline allows no room for mistakes, especially while an officer is in command. Majors seemed to have the greatest concern in this area. Junior officers believe that "career expectations and timetables were uncertain."⁶⁷

A byproduct of uncertainty with the potential of a military careers was the perception that junior leaders were leaving the service in record numbers. Statistically, the number rose in the late 1990s and generated

significant concern. In response, the Army conducted a number of surveys and sensing sessions in an effort to understand the causes of the problem. Overall, sixty-five percent of the reasons given for leaving the Army dealt with job or career dissatisfaction. The items identified as most frequently contributing to this problem were high Operations Tempo (OPTEMOP), poor leadership, lack of control in obtaining assignments, excessive micromanagement, and limited or slow promotion opportunities.⁶⁸ The most common reason for staying identified was “liking their job or working with soldiers.”⁶⁹ Some officers returned to the military after leaving. “They commented that they returned because they were disillusioned about the quality of their civilian work experience.”⁷⁰ The civilian work force demonstrated lack of teamwork, no integrity, no honor, no esprit de corps, no discipline and low morale. Officers who returned are a great resource the Army can use to get the word out to those who are considering leaving the service. Officers who left and returned reported the greatest job satisfaction of all the officers surveyed.⁷¹ How are senior leaders responding to the junior officer retention problem?

One observation that indicated potential for dysfunction is noted in a briefing packet presented to the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander, General John Abrams, in January 2000. The briefing packet addressed the officer-manning problem, namely the junior officer retention problem. The title on slide twenty-four is noteworthy and concerning. It says “Junior officer retention.....this is a LTC problem!!!!”⁷² This form of presentation of the information was not encouraging. It gave a potential indication that the senior leaders in the army are transferring blame, whether they were or not. When an institution has a problem with junior leaders, the whole institution has cause for concern.

The historical examination presented in this chapter indicates that officer retention is a very complex problem, which cannot be attributed to any one cause, but has multiple causes. The type of mind-set, as communicated in identification of the poor junior officer retention as a lieutenant colonel problem, could potentially create hesitant battalion and brigade commanders who perceive the organization was more inclined to assign blame than to create an environment that worked as a team to address the problem. The author could not help but wonder if it was this sentiment, in an atmosphere of declining resources, contributes to the high turn down rate for command selections at the battalion and brigade levels.⁷³ Many senior leaders were turning down command at an unprecedented rate in 2000 and 2001. Selection for battalion and brigade command positions are critical steps to increased success in the Army; senior leaders

appear to be losing interest in these career-enhancing assignments at an alarming rate. This particular trend of senior officers declining command in significant numbers was not evident in the examination of behavior in the officer corps over the last thirty years. There are, however, other behaviors that are.

Overall, tensions between junior and senior leaders appear to be a trend over the last thirty years. Historically both junior and senior leaders contend that senior leaders have tendencies towards being selfish, dishonest, focused on ticket-punching, micromanaging, enforcing a zero-defect mentality, establishing poor communication and failing to develop junior leaders. The major contributors to these tendencies were the officer personnel evaluation and promotion systems and the up or out promotion policy. These systems appeared to promote behaviors in senior leaders that are viewed critically by junior leaders. What would functional relationships between junior and senior leaders in the U.S. Army look like? Chapter three outlines the characteristics of functional relationships from the perspective of leadership, which then are used to analyze the current climate between junior and senior leaders in 2000 to determine functionality or dysfunctionality.

CHARACTERISTICS OF FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

CHAPTER 3

Functionality is not discussed as frequently as dysfunctionality. The concept of dysfunctionality has taken center stage in the press recently. There are dysfunctional basketball teams, dysfunctional churches, dysfunctional families, and dysfunctional individuals. Many individuals claim to either be dysfunctional or are in relationships with others who are dysfunctional.

This concept of dysfunctionality is now expanding into the ranks of the organizational level. An example of this new phenomenon is evident in an article written by the *Kansas City Star* sports columnist, Jason Whitlock. This newspaper is headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri. This opinionated sports writer referred to the local University of Kansas Jayhawk basketball team as dysfunctional. This enlightened columnist wrote

After a week of counseling to address a Big 12 weekend of finger pointing, Roy Williams turned his seemingly dysfunction family loose on Cal State Northridge. The Matadors learned what Williams already knew: The Kansas Jayhawks are pretty difficult to deal with when they are not fighting among themselves.⁷⁴

There is even a company, which advertises on the Internet that it has experience with improving dysfunctional organizations and can help a dysfunctional company get healthy. With all this discussion of dysfunction, many are wondering what functional looks like.

A functional relationship between junior and senior officers would have the five characteristics, discussed previously, which, if in place, will create healthy interpersonal dynamics. This chapter will discuss these characteristics in order to give the reader a clear understanding of the concepts. Once understood, one can use them to analyze the U.S. Army officer corps. This chapter seeks to go into depth on the specifics of how to attain these characteristics.

An Attitude of Service

The first concept explored is that of an attitude of service. What generates an attitude of service? Is it servant leadership? The author's first exposure to the concept of servant leadership occurred in 1993, while serving as a company commander. Civilians introduced the author to the concept, not formal military leadership training. The concept crystallized the sense of privilege, vocation and responsibility to serve others that command entails. It helped make the concept of self-less service understandable.

There is a Center for Servant Leadership founded by Robert K. Greenleaf. Greenleaf is viewed in academic circles as the “grandfather of the modern empowerment movement in business leadership.”⁷⁵ Greenleaf described servant leadership.

The servant leader is servant first...It begins with the natural feeling that one wants to serve first. Then conscious choice brings one to aspire to lead...The difference manifests itself in the care taken by the servant—first to make sure that other people’s highest priority needs are being served. The best test and the most difficult to administer, is: do those served grow as persons; do they, while being served, become healthier, wiser, freer, more autonomous, more likely themselves to become servants? And, what is the effect on the least privileged in society; will they benefit, or at least, not be further deprived?⁷⁶

Servant Leadership is taught as a course on leadership in many civilian universities. Columbus State University (CSU) has a web page entitled *Servant Leadership at CSU*. The web page states:

Servant leadership is a practical philosophy concerned with the ethical use of power and authority. Servant leaders believe that power and authority are for helping others grow, not for ruling, exploiting, or gaining advantage by setting individuals or groups against one another.⁷⁷

The United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, New York has the primary mission of educating, training and inspiring future members of the U.S. Army officer corps. USMA has a lesson plan posted on the Academy web site. The lesson plan is titled “Leadership and Ethics: Gus Lee Video and Discussion.”⁷⁸ Gus Lee is a renowned speaker on servant leadership who speaks to cadets at USMA. A lesson plan at USMA, entitled “Values Lesson” emphasized “the inseparable nature of leadership and ethics.”⁷⁹ The lesson outline included questions that Cadets at the United States Military Academy discussed following the viewing of a video lecture given by Gus Lee, a speaker for the National Conference for Ethics in America. One of the “possible facilitator questions”⁸⁰ found on the lesson plan on the USMA web site is noteworthy.

Mr. Lee implied leaders must always subordinate their own self-interests to those of their subordinates. One of the Army values is self-less service. What does it mean to serve your own subordinates? Is this antithetical to leadership (which connotes authority)?⁸¹

What gives leaders the freedom to serve others while still retaining authority? Is it humility? General Franks, the Seventh Corps Commander during the Gulf War in 1991, spoke to some members of the SAMS class of 2001, and told the students that SAMS graduates can afford to be humble. SAMS graduates, at times, are criticized for being arrogant. SAMS students receive a second year of military education following completion of CGSC and have the privilege of serving the Army as planners at the division and

corps level. Based on Franks' comment the author concluded, humility is a critical ingredient of being effective planners and commanders because the well being of the organization is at stake every time a plan is produced.

Humility drives ones desire for serving others.

The virtue of humility is often over-looked in leadership discussions. Humility is not brought up when studying some of history's greatest military leaders (such as George S. Patton, Douglas MacArthur, Napoleon Bonapart and Erwin Rommel)...Humility, or the quality of genuine modesty and unpretentiousness, is often disregarded when describing traits of good leaders because it seems to suggest a lack of toughness and resolve essential in an effective leader. However, the humble leader lacks arrogance, not aggressiveness. The will to serve others eclipses any drive to promote self. Humility can even carry a certain spiritual tone, as the leader's activities are free of ego and self-aggrandizement-all in the best interest of the success of many versus the prominence of an individual.⁸²

Why is an attitude of service needed? Humans, by nature, tend to be self-focused. Leadership, in part, should seek to overcome this natural human tendency in oneself and in others. Overcoming this natural human tension requires a change in approach to leadership. A change in approach to leadership can generate an attitude of service across the organization. This change in approach is demonstrated in the execution of servant leadership.

In every vocation, those who truly excel are those who have a genuine desire to serve others. The most notable physicians view their vocation as a calling to serve the sick and diseased. Truly great politicians see themselves as "public servants." The greatest of all educators see students as individuals and gain their greatest rewards from seeing students reach their potential in developing their talents and interests.⁸³

Dr. Chapman contends that many biographies of great men and women who lived sacrificial lives held the belief that service was a virtue or value.⁸⁴

Writer Philip Yancey notes that toward the end of his life, Albert Einstein removed the portraits of two scientists-Newton and Maxwell-from his wall. He replaced those with portraits of Gandi and Schweitzer. *Einstein explained that it was time to replace the image of success with the image of service.*⁸⁵

The Army officer corps, as well, should establish an image of service as opposed to one of success. Senior leaders should gain the greatest reward from seeing those entrusted to their care reach their potential and develop their talents and interests.

Fostering Trust Through Effective Communication

The next characteristic of functionality examined is the concept of fostering trust through effective communication. Trust is the most basic of relational imperatives. Many authors today contend that there is a distrust of social leaders and a sense of trust in the community across the board.

This general lack of trust of our social leaders and institutions points to a cultural breakdown. We have lost the sense of community that former trust cultures provided. Now people are together as individuals, not a community. Many of our organizations, even our families, lack the cohesion that mutual trust provides. One result is that many people suffer from isolation, anomie, and anxiety. Unless workers trust not only leaders' motives, but also their ability to lead, they will not follow....[some] suggest that this distrust of leadership is endemic....the problem is not lack of leaders, but a lack of trusting environments within which leadership is possible and without which it is impossible.⁸⁶

It is trust, not power, that makes organizations effective. Leaders should focus on development rather than domination of followers. If a culture has norms that limit trust, the organization should identify these norms and change them.⁸⁷ "Trust can help lessen conflicts and possibly avoid conflicts before dysfunctional behavior takes place."⁸⁸ Key components to establishing trust are the amount of empathy of the participants and the positive regard each has for the other. Relationships must be two ways. A two-way relationship is defined as

simply expressing trust in others and receiving trust from others. One without the other aborts the trust relationship. This suggests that leaders can generate a climate of trust when they can trust first. This task is difficult because many leaders and followers see the relationship ...where trust is only given upward...leaders need to develop trust before they begin problem solving or other significant activity....Where trust is present, leadership can take place. Where it is missing, we lose the ability to lead.⁸⁹

What one communicates is impacted by the level of trust one has? Mutual trust fosters cohesion. The existence of the lack of trust makes functionality impossible because there is no basis for a sense of security in the relationship. The junior officers will only speak freely to the senior leader when convinced the senior leader has their best interest in mind. If this is the case, there is no fear that what is said will be used against the speaker. In a healthy army, the focus should be cooperation, not competition. Competition generates fear; cooperation generates understanding. Cooperation helps build trust.

Building trust is a dynamic process, not something that is achieved and then remains. Trust must be cultivated daily. Integral to the development of trust is effective communication.

Communication involves two simple elements: self-revelation, in which one is telling the other something of his or her thoughts, feelings, and experiences while the other is

receiving this self-revelation as information and seeking to understand what the first person is thinking and feeling. The second in turn reveals his or her own thoughts, feelings and experiences while the other listens and seeks to understand. The simple process of taking and listening maintains...⁹⁰

openness in relationships.

Openness in relationships is created by good communication. Assuming one can understand another's thoughts, feelings and motives by simply observing behavior is dangerous. Officers cannot read each other's minds, even though they might think they can. Observation of behavior helps to identify anger or sadness, but cannot truly know what caused this feeling. The only way to know for sure the cause is to communicate with the other person. Communication at an emotional level is the key to understanding the causes of the emotions of others. Asking another human being if they like their job or anything else, is a great way to stimulate an emotional response. Individuals tend to answer questions like this with their personal opinions and answers reflect their thoughts and emotions.⁹¹ In a healthy relationship, the discussion of emotions needs to be a two-way street. Junior and senior leaders must discuss negative feelings of hurt and disappointment as well as positive feelings.⁹² Failure to discuss emotions, both negative and positive, denies those around an officer the opportunity to know and understand the officer's struggles. Now this monograph will examine the concept of leaders who teach and train.

Senior Leaders Who Teach and Train

The third element of functionality is teaching and training. Teaching and training have two different meanings. Teaching is generally thought to be word oriented, where the senior officer imparts instruction verbally. The concept of training is more action oriented. The leader usually demonstrates an action and the student repeats or practices the action in return. The teaching and training addressed in this monograph covers daily interaction based instruction as opposed to formal classroom setting type instruction. The Army executes formal training well. The focus of this paper is on functional teaching and training using interpersonal interactions. Functional leaders are constantly teaching and training through their words and actions with junior leaders daily. Effective leadership seeks to balance teaching and training. What are potential examples of effective teaching?

Teaching

One form of effective teaching is the use of words of affirmation. Functional relationships use words of affirmation as a matter of habit. Human beings thrive when they receive affirmation and praise. Effective leaders must understand the psychology of human beings in order to really be effective. Words of affirmation and kindness are powerful tools available to the leader. Different subordinates have varied levels of need for affirmation. “Organizational researchers have been telling us for years that affirmation motivates people much more than financial incentives.... People thrive on praise. It does more to keep...people fulfilled than fortune or fame could do.”⁹³ Affirmation is key, especially when subordinates are asked to accomplish extremely demanding and difficult endeavors.

Affirmation can come in the form of kind words of appreciation or notes of encouragement. Affirmation is critically important, especially for new employees. Each subordinate is different and requires different amounts of affirmation. The Affirmation Continuum illustrates this point.⁹⁴

| Affirmation Continuum | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| <u>Desperados</u> | <u>Auto-pilots</u> |
| Little confidence | Self-reliant |
| Laps up affirmation | Skeptical of affirmation |
| “The more the better” | “Leave me alone” |
| Fragile | Tough as nails |

Figure 2-1

Most subordinates tend to fall in the middle of the continuum. A good leader should be able to read this in the countenance of subordinates. This is especially true for single subordinates. The more dysfunctional and tough a person’s background, the more they are going to need...regular affirmation. The younger generations need more nurturing than the more rugged depression and World War II veterans.”⁹⁵ The desperados have an extremely high need for affirmation. Leaders can invest in this type with constant effort. Constant effort will yield tremendous results. The autopilots tend to be the extreme on the other end of the spectrum. This type of subordinate is rare. They tend to be either too busy or skeptical of kindness from past experiences. The leaders best recourse in this situation is to cultivate kindness.⁹⁶

Leaders must ensure praise is not automatic, but goes to those who meet high standards and ideals. Leaders must look for the good in everyone. Thank-you notes can be powerful. An example of the

effectiveness of this technique is seen in the comments made by a leader observing the modeled behavior of the boss. Leaders tend to

underestimate the power of the tiniest personal touch. And of all the personal touches...the short, handwritten “nice job” notes...have the highest impact. (It even seems to beat a call-something about the tangibility.)

A former boss (who’s gone on to a highly successful career) religiously took about 15 minutes (max) at the end of each day, at 5:30 P.M., 6:30 P.M., whenever, to jot a half-dozen paragraph-long notes to people who’d given him time during the day or who’d made a provocative remark at some meeting...[the boss] was dumbfounded by the number of recipients who subsequently thanked him for thanking them.⁹⁷

Another tool a leader has is encouragement. Encouragement satisfies the basic need of people to feel cared for and welcome. Techniques used to encourage are listening, empathizing, comforting, and burden sharing. Good leaders are not the main talkers in these situations. They should practice the art of listening. A leader must be able to share pain and joy with those they lead and comfort as needed. Leaders should get out of their office to pay a visit to thank others. Another technique is to ask other leaders for subordinates who deserve recognition and send them handwritten notes of appreciation. Also, leaders should strive to thank people publicly in newsletters, at meetings and formations. Most importantly, a leader should build others up. Doing this can be infectious and will cause others in the organization to behave in praiseworthy fashion.⁹⁸

Senior leaders should use these processes to teach junior leaders the truths one believes to be important. Senior leaders must choose to make time to teach junior leaders through daily interaction. Junior leaders are the future of the organization and the only lasting legacy a senior leader can leave. Senior leaders have approximately eighteen to twenty years to share their knowledge and values in order to develop future senior leaders who can evaluate and choose their own interests and values to pass on to future generations of military leadership.

Senior leaders have much to impart. Senior leaders should share Army family history and traditions, socially appropriate behavior, socially inappropriate behavior, intellectual facts and theories, moral values and practical insights on all aspects of military life that will make the junior leader’s life more productive and meaningful. Senior leaders can teach social skills and pass on information that is critical to the success of junior officers. Teaching for a senior leader involves affirmation and praise; it includes constructive

criticism and a comparative evaluation of performance. The senior leaders convey the cultural norms to the junior leaders and teach them how to operate and successfully lead within the military officer corps.

Leading in the U.S. military officer corps requires creating an environment of security. Security is predicated upon a mutual understanding of expectations. Often senior leaders think that junior officers do not want guidance. This is actually not the case. Juniors realize that seniors have experienced a great deal of life and have valuable lessons to offer that will allow the junior to avoid the same challenges. Guidance creates security. With security, junior leaders can grow and learn.⁹⁹

Senior leaders must equip junior leaders for growth and survival in the modern military world. This type of teaching must involve dialogue and informal conversation between the junior and senior leaders. Officer professional developments can include the gathering of all officers in the battalion to discuss a military book or article all have read. This helps the senior leader gain insight into the thoughts, perceptions and perspectives of the junior leaders. The book *Once An Eagle* by Anton Myrer is a classic novel of war about Sam Damon, an officer who lives and leads by his values. General Charles Krulak, an officer held in the highest esteem by captains in the U.S. Army,¹⁰⁰ applauded the novel. General Krulak said,

Once An Eagle has more to teach about leadership-whether it is in the boardroom or on the battlefields-then a score of modern-day management texts. It is a primer that lays out, through the lives of its two main characters, lessons on how and how not to lead.¹⁰¹

This exercise in a group of officers would challenge both the leader and the led and open a forum for discussion of functional and dysfunctional characteristics of leadership. The feedback would be invaluable for both the senior leader and the junior officers. It may even spark tough questions, given the concerns held by junior leaders in 2000, as evidenced by comments they made on recent surveys.¹⁰²

Senior leaders must be willing to answer the question why, even though this may be frustrating. Senior leaders must give honest answers. This will help junior leaders internalize values. Sometimes senior leaders initiate the conversation and sometimes the junior leaders will initiate the conversation in the form of questions. Creative teaching is not necessarily formal instruction only. The senior leader must be willing to execute creative teaching anytime the student and teacher are together.

“Values, however, are best passed on to the next generation not by dogmatism but by modeling and dialogue.”¹⁰³ Junior officers will determine what is important to senior officers by observing their lives.

Functional relationships involve dialogue. There is always a chance junior leaders will reject the value of senior leaders. This is the choice of the junior leader. The senior leader can only model what they believe in. Senior leaders can gain the greatest influence by leading junior leaders in dialogue. Senior leaders need to make a conscience effort to do this; otherwise they risk developing nonfunctional relationships. Now this monograph will explore how to fosterer risk taking.

Teaching By Encouraging Risk Taking

Creating an environment that encourages risk taking is the responsibility of the senior leader. Senior leaders foster this by instilling courage in junior leaders. “Courage is the state of mind that gives the ability to explore possibilities, to take risks, to accomplish what others may find impossible.”¹⁰⁴ Words of senior leaders are powerful. They can encourage or discourage junior and subordinate leaders. Healthy families give many encouraging words even if perfection is not achieved.¹⁰⁵ “Encouraging words motivate positive behavior; condemning words stifle effort.”¹⁰⁶ Senior leaders should praise the effort of junior leaders as they develop. Perfection may take time and encouragement is the key to fostering risk taking. Encouragement involves the expression of confidence that the senior leader believes the junior leader can do a great job.

Brigadier General Douglas MacArthur demonstrated an example of creative teaching through a balance of words and action during World War I.

Trust can be a powerful confidence builder. We are affected significantly in our performance by the faith (or lack of it) our boss places in us...Brig. Gen Douglas MacArthur was in the trenches just before dawn; he took the Distinguished Service Cross ribbon from his own tunic and pinned it to the chest of a young major about to lead his battalion in an attack, explaining that he knew the major would do heroic deeds that day. Such displays of trust can spur both leaders and followers to excel.¹⁰⁷

An example of discouragement is also relayed by one general officer serving in a combat command.

“We ... occasionally practice what we preach, but all in all we’re gripped by our collective distrust of people.” Distrust inhibits soldiers from sharing responsibility and taking initiative and is, therefore, of more than clinical or transitory harm to an effective military unit.¹⁰⁸

The senior leader must train but ultimately should give the junior leader some freedom in accomplishing the mission. Humans are not robots. Humans are creative, thinking beings, each with unique gifts and abilities. No two people do things exactly the same. There are multiple ways to accomplish tasks and

differing personalities approach problem solving in different ways. “Individual freedom within limits recognizes our differences and allows creativity.”¹⁰⁹

Often, when junior leaders experience set backs, it is valuable for them to hear of how senior leaders overcame similar setbacks. Senior leaders need to let the junior leader know that this is something that is recoverable but must be honest about where the junior leader stands. Being honest means some leaders must make corrections.

Functional leaders correct when it is needed. There are two ways to give correction, negatively or positively. These correction patterns will be examined. Positive correction differentiates between creativity and conformity. Healthy leaders only seek to correct destructive and detrimental behaviors, not destroy unique expressions of creativity. A guide to help ensure this mistake is not made is to ask two questions “Is the behavior about to be corrected truly destructive to the junior officer?” If this behavior continues, will it be detrimental to the officer’s future in the Army? If the senior leader determines the answer to be yes, the correction is appropriate. If the answer is not, the senior leader should examine the situation further. There may be an opportunity here to develop creativity and imagination. Healthy leaders ask questions as a safeguard to stifling creativity before making the decision to correct a junior leader.¹¹⁰

There are two ways to correct others. Correction can be given out of uncontrolled anger or with a caring spirit. Correction with a caring spirit focuses on long-term benefit of the junior officer. Venting of uncontrolled anger on the other hand can be extremely destructive to the junior officer. Anger occurs in senior leaders when one perceives the junior officer has done something wrong or refuses to follow guidelines. Other instances, which may invoke anger, include a junior officer who continues to pressure a senior officer when a decision is already made.¹¹¹

Anger is a normal human emotion, which everyone experiences at one time or another. Anger, from a leadership perspective can motivate the senior leader to take corrective action. Unchecked anger, though, can be destructive. Often when angry, leaders are prone to say words and demonstrate behavior later regretted. Taking the time to cool down before correcting a junior officer may result in a more restrained and appropriate response. A simple technique of counting to ten when the leader feels anger is effective in preventing mistakes. Taking time to cool down will allow the senior leader to think through the additional

requirements for disciplinary action, if appropriate. A caring leader will ask the question “Is the correction about to be given for the benefit of the officer, or the entire officer corps or Army community?”¹¹²

If the senior officer determines the correction and discipline are in order, the junior officer must then receive an explanation. Screaming tends to ostracize the junior officer and often may not correct the behavior. The senior officer should seek to explain the wrong behavior and teach the junior officer the appropriate behavior for the future. If an officer is young, the senior leader should give them the opportunity to grow and mature. Humiliation is not an appropriate technique. A senior leader who has a functional relationship with junior leaders will seek to take actions that allow the junior officer to become a more responsible officer in the future. Most importantly, if a senior leader makes the mistake of correcting with uncontrolled anger and later realizes this was not appropriate, the senior leader should apologize to the junior leader for the loss of temper and correct what was said during a fit of anger. Humble leaders can admit they made a mistake and seek restitution.

Creative correction also involves only bringing up the specific details of the situation at hand. Bringing up a laundry list of past failures is not functional. Many successful people failed before achieving great success.¹¹³ Many successful military officers experienced failures. General Ulysses S. Grant is an example of an officer who suffered military defeats prior to the Vicksburg and the Overland Campaigns. President Lincoln allowed Grant to remain as the commander despite the setbacks because Lincoln knew Grant would fight. Lincoln weathered through accusations of Grant’s drinking and verbally encouraged Grant by saying that if this were true, then all the generals should drink more. Grant started to mature in the ability to coordinate the battles of separate units to support each other and achieve attainment of the nations strategic objectives. Some believe Grant demonstrated great military genius and refer to this great battle captain as the father of operational art.¹¹⁴ Lincoln created an environment for Grant to learn.

In 2001, a comment frequently echoed in many Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) after action reviews is that it takes the blood of many thousands of soldiers to train one general. BCTP seeks to do this through the use of digits on computers instead of spilling the blood of real soldiers. Senior leaders must take chances to ensure the professional development of junior leaders. Taking chances involves mastering the art of delegation.

Often it is faster to just do it and not delegate tasks or excessively interfere with the execution of tasks. It takes more effort to communicate the task and then wait for the results than if the senior leader did it. Doing instead of delegating is not in the best interest developmentally for the junior officer. Sometimes senior leaders have to accept risk and delegate a task so the junior leader gains experience in that task. Senior officers across the Army must understand that mistakes will be made in the process of allowing officers to develop. Zero tolerance for mistakes creates a tendency for a direct supervisor to micromanage a subordinate. The Army must rethink how it views mistakes in general. How does a leader execute functional training?

Training

In functional environments, senior leaders accept responsibility for and train junior leaders. Training involves demonstrating to the junior leader how to accomplish the task, observing the execution of the task by the junior leader and providing feedback to the junior leader to ensure future improvement. This is a lot different than just telling the junior leader how to execute the task. This training also includes coaching the junior leaders on character development issues such as dealing with emotions like fear, anger and disappointment. The senior leader is also focused on character development and keeps observation on fundamental values such as honesty, hard work, and courage. Modeling good training to junior officers will reap benefits in years to come. The junior officers will model the behaviors shown by the senior leaders to future generations.¹¹⁵

The most effective training tool a military leader has is personal example. Junior officers are the first to recognize when a senior leader's words are not consistent with their actions. The functional senior leader is committed to modeling moral values. Moral values are the belief in what is right and wrong. Disrespect is the byproduct of a senior leader who allows a gap to exist between what one says and what one does. The width of the gap is directly proportional to the width of disrespect. Spiritual and moral issues are easier "caught than taught."¹¹⁶ If the Army wants a moral organization, it starts with the modeling of the desired morality by senior leaders. If the senior leaders view the organization as deficient, assigning blame will not do. The senior leader needs to look within at what one is modeling and seek to start change here. This includes ensuring reporting systems do not pressure subordinates to falsify information and honestly evaluating performance. Officer studies mentioned in the previous chapter clearly indicate that the

behavior of senior leaders at the top of the organization can effectively change the behavior of those below them. The organizational change desired will then quickly follow.

Senior leaders should set leadership examples that they want junior leaders to imitate. Additionally, senior leaders should hold subordinates to violations of dysfunctional behavior. If junior leaders decide the leadership examples of the senior leaders are worthy of emulation, the military will have taken a step into the future. Great leadership is not easily forgotten. Senior leaders must introspectively ask “What if the junior leaders become like the senior leader?” This is a great guide for moral questions and can help to sift through moral dilemmas. Senior leaders should live their military lives in a way that will not embarrass if junior leaders follow their examples.

Bad examples can also serve as inspiration for change and can teach junior leaders what not to do. However, research shows that junior leaders tend to model the example of the leaders who have gone before them. A move from dysfunctional leadership to functional leadership is difficult, but possible. The leader who decides to make this change must make a conscious effort to do so. Positive models of leadership make the execution of good leadership throughout the organization much easier.¹¹⁷

Senior leaders are responsible for the development of junior leaders. A major tool senior leaders have for development is through the operational experience gained by junior leaders. Senior leaders manage the rotation of junior officers in certain key leadership development slots such as platoon leaders and company commander. Certain jobs help junior leaders develop progressively and acquire the skills necessary to continue as an effective officer at higher levels of responsibilities. Senior leaders have a mandate to ensure junior leaders receive sufficient time in these critical positions. If there are limited positions for company command, the senior leader must make a hard decision and ensure the top performers, as a minimum, receive two years in these key slots. Decisions must be made for the best interest of the Army. This may mean some officers do not get experience in these key leadership positions. Senior Leaders must make hard decisions when there are limited command opportunities. Junior leaders mature in command by practicing leadership and receiving feedback. Short command tours of one year only serve to propagate a short term, ticket-punching mentality and are not beneficial to the soldiers serving in the unit. Ensuring junior leaders have a minimum of two years in command is the best way senior leaders can ensure junior leaders are trained and ready for their future responsibilities in the officer corps.

Senior leaders must always strive to maximize the training opportunities for the junior leaders. Senior leaders should ask the question “What training can be done to most effectively teach the junior leaders the lessons required?” There is a big difference between reading a book on a battle and actually going to the battlefield. Senior leaders should integrate words with actions. One way senior leaders do this is by participating with the junior leaders in activities. As a minimum, this models the value of relationships and spending time together.

Functional communities do things together. These activities can be specifically for professional development or fun. Doing activities together creates the fellowship that is needed to bond officers together. Junior officers will remember these experiences best and seek to emulate the same type of activities in the future with the junior officers they someday will have responsibility over.¹¹⁸ Now the functional characteristic of caring leadership will be discussed.

The Senior Leader As A Caring Leader

Chapman’s fourth characteristic of functional leadership involves a caring attitude towards others. Caring leadership often appears to contradict the need for military leaders to be tough with subordinates. The defining statement of the profession of arms, for this author, came while attending the first military science class for freshmen at The United States Military Academy in West Point, New York. The first page of the student text stated that the military officer specializes in the management of violence. Being too malleable would appear to be dangerous in this profession. The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) curriculum focuses on decision making and developing the skills future commanders need to be decisive. Additionally, members of SAMS study the human dimension of combat. History is filled with stories of decisive and controlling leaders who were successful. The story that comes to mind most frequently is that of General George S. Patton slapping the face of a soldier who showed cowardice during the commander’s hospital visit during World War II.

Military command and leadership involves leading other human beings, possibly to their death. “Leadership without love can be despotic. Love without leadership can become weakness.”¹¹⁹ A noted author, Paul Malone, after serving over thirty years as a military officer, penned a book on leadership aptly named, *Love ‘Em and Lead ‘Em*.¹²⁰ General Matthew B. Ridgeway assumed command of a demoralized

and defeated Eight United States Army and led them to victory in the Korean War. This proven combat commander urges future leaders to love and tells them this is the root of being able to sacrifice for others.

Archibald Rutledge once wrote that there can be no real love without a willingness to sacrifice. Tuck this away in your inner minds. It may pay off in some crisis coming to you in the years now hidden beyond the horizon. Do you love your country and its flag? *Do you love ... the men with whom you will be privileged to share service and to command? If you do, then you will be prepared to sacrifice for them, if your responsibilities or the situation so demands.*¹²¹

Caring leaders are not authoritarian dictators who rule with iron fists or leaders that are mushy and weak. A functional leader does not fit into either of these extremes. A caring leader is in touch with feelings and can express pain, joy, sympathy and encouragement. Caring leaders are able to relate to subordinate junior officers on an emotional level yet remain strong and dependable, always focused on the well being of the unit and the Army. When things go wrong, a caring leader looks for solutions and does not accuse and act in ways that lead to isolation. Most effective leaders are servants, not dictators and value partnerships with junior officers in the organization. Serving and caring leadership is congruent.

Caring leaders should demand appropriate character from future leaders. Caring leaders look for basic immaturity, lack of responsibility, poor character development, controlling personalities and poor relational skills.¹²² Senior leaders must demand improvement of junior leaders in these areas.

Caring leadership is critical to any commander's success. Military senior leaders must create a caring climate for junior officers and soldiers. Caring environments focus on managing the profession of arms for personal growth of subordinates. What are some techniques that can help achieve this?

James Autry, author of the book, *Love and Profit The Art of Caring Leadership*, lays out five uncomplicated guidelines that help create a caring environment in which subordinates can grow.

1. **Avoid In-Box Management.** This style of leadership is cued by what comes into the in-box. This style leader will stay in their office and wait to receive distribution. The leader proceeds to check the distribution for mistakes. Autry contends that if a leader is in touch with employees on a regular basis, surprises in the inbox will occur less frequently and mistakes will dwindle in number and importance.
2. **Care About Oneself.** Good leaders invigorate and inspire others. Good leaders accomplish this by exerting energy. A leader cannot do this to another unless they have the energy source to do

this. Healthy living is the only way to create abundant energy. Leaders owe it to the organization and subordinates to manage healthcare personally. Taking care of oneself implies working reasonable hours as the boss and not condoning workaholic environments.

3. **Be Honest.** This is the single most important factor in a leader or manager's relationship with subordinates and peers. Often leaders shy away from honesty when confronted with making critical evaluation reports on subordinates. Honest leaders care enough to tell subordinates their performance is not effectively accomplishing the mission. Caring involves setting standards and enforcing them. Caring leaders will work to help subordinates develop. Honest actions include putting subordinates on probations and firing them if warranted. Being honest is difficult, but dishonesty is a sign of weakness.
4. **Trust Subordinates.** Distrusting subordinates is easy to justify in a leaders mind. As mentioned earlier in this monograph, trusting subordinates involves risk taking.

5. If An Officer Does Not Care About People, That Officer Should Resign Immediately.

Officers must be truthful. Officers that are appointed leaders over others and do not care about people will have increased stress and eventually cause a great deal of heartache for those working for them. Subordinates want to know how much a leader cares before caring about how much a leader knows.¹²³

Caring leaders exercise what Chapman refers to as "active leadership."¹²⁴ An evaluation template for determining effectiveness as an active leader is found in Annex A. Functional leadership is active leadership, not responsive leadership. Senior leaders need to take the initiative and aggressively seek to be involved in the development of junior leaders. Passive leadership responds and reacts and waits for the junior leader to initiate the process. The active senior leader is always determining how to stimulate the minds and emotions of junior leaders to positive growth.¹²⁵ Active leadership engages subordinates in conversation by asking probing questions. Senior Leaders can better teach their own personal history through conversation as opposed to presenting it in formal settings or telling war stories all the time. These regular conversations should exchange thoughts, feelings, ideas, desires and decisions. Senior Leaders can use these conversations to teach values, answer questions, encourage and plant ideas. Conversation is one of the essential tools of leadership. Functional leaders use the art of conversation regularly.¹²⁶ If a junior

leader rarely talks to a senior leader and then only listens to the senior leaders war stories, it may not be well received. Regular exchanges are key to keeping the lines of communication open. General Ridgeway provides advice to senior leaders.

Closely akin to the relationship with staff officers is keeping in close personal touch with your principal subordinate commanders-in the division, with your brigade and separate battalion commanders; in the corps, with your division commanders, their chiefs of staff, and as many of the commanders of attached corps units as you can; and in the army with the corps and division commanders and their chiefs of staff. There is always time for these visits; administrative work can be done at night. By day you belong to your troops.¹²⁷

General Ridgeway made a commitment to spending time with junior leaders. This came at a sacrifice but remained paramount, even in a combat environment. Senior leaders can benefit greatly from the model of General Ridgeway in 2001.

A caring leader believes in values because they bring a level of satisfaction, peace of mind and purpose in life. The leader desires to teach these values to the junior officers.¹²⁸

Values are simply those things in life to which we attach worth. Values are strongly held beliefs by which we order our lives. If we believe in the virtue of honesty, then we will seek to be honest in our dealings with others. If we believe in the virtue of hard work, then we will seek to give an honest day's work to our employer. If we believe in the virtue of kindness, it will be demonstrated in the way we treat and speak to our neighbors.¹²⁹

Caring leadership involves doing things for subordinates that communicates appreciation nonverbally. These are called "acts of service." Acts of service can be simple tasks such as having junior leaders over for dinner, and attending organizational sporting events. Rendering acts of service combined with words of affirmation and praise can create an environment where subordinate officers will feel fulfilled and in turn will be open to teaching and training. As time progresses, leaders can assess what means the most to subordinates by responses to words of affirmation and acts of service. If a subordinate verbally seeks feedback by asking how they are doing, they probably value words of affirmation. If subordinates constantly invite the commander to sporting events, acts of service or quality time are probably important. Listening to what subordinates complain about most often will give clues to what is most important. As a leader, if the preference is uncertain, rotate back and forth. When subordinate's needs are met, they are more responsive to teaching and training and tend to promote unit harmony. When needs are unmet, subordinates tend to be unbearable. Keeping notes on what is important to subordinates is important. A

leaders job is to create an environment where junior leaders can grow and develop. Investment in the human dimension of leadership can reap tremendous benefits and significantly enhance the training environment.

Caring leaders sets priorities. A caring, functional leader understands that people are more important than things. Caring leaders will examine and control the time they spend with subordinates and not allow themselves to be overcome by events.¹³⁰ Commanders at the highest levels can facilitate this by developing sensitivity to interfering with quality time a subordinate could be spending with the units they command. Senior leaders that emphasize time with junior officers will saturate the organization with this philosophy. Additionally, caring leaders will set out to discover and understand the needs of junior officers.

If a senior leader wants to create an environment that fosters commitment, one must consider establishing an environment that provides for the security of the junior officers. Doing this means relaying that the senior leader is committed to junior leaders and when conflict or disagreement arises, the senior leader will listen, understand and seek resolution. When mistakes are made, a caring senior leader is not quick to assign blame on others but will stand by the junior leaders side and accept a certain element of defect as part of the developmental process.

A functional leader is concerned about the self-worth of the junior leaders. A caring senior leader is willing to talk to the junior leader about concerns and encourage the junior leader to pursue what is in the best interest of the officer and the military. In 2000, the U.S. Army officer corps has many married officers. These officers must balance work with family.

Senior leaders need to create an environment where junior officers can do this. Senior leaders must ask for an honest days effort, not a slave who has no life outside of the military. This is not a generational issue; this is simply leadership that does not abuse subordinates. In peacetime, there is really no justification for abuse. Combat and deployments require extended hours. Senior leaders should manage schedules when not in these circumstances. Senior leaders who are caring leaders focus on ensuring the officer is able to balance time with family and serve the Army. Studies on long-term fatigue from scheduled overtime are revealing. There are devastating consequences to personnel who repetitively work over forty-hour workweeks. Productivity of workers and teams decreases substantially during the first week with only fifty-four hours of output for sixty hours worked. As extended hour work schedules

continue, productivity decreases more. After nine weeks of working sixty-hour workweeks, productivity is below the normal forty hours output.¹³¹ Senior leaders who watch the work hours of subordinates will actually yield more efficient results when avoiding extended work hours. The next topic of discussion is that of junior officers that honor and obey.

Honor and Obey

The last functional characteristic is the concept of honor and obedience. A functional relationship involving a leader and subordinates involves the junior rendering honor and obedience to the senior. This was long held as a tradition in society. The United States, like much of the Western world, derives values from the Judeo-Christian tradition. The main text, which comes to mind when speaking of this concept, is the *Ten Commandments*. The *Ten Commandments* first appeared in ancient texts of the *Holy Bible* and is the law, as issued by God, to his servant Moses. This law governed the lives of the Jewish people and is greatly reflected in modern legal codes found in society at the beginning of this new century. The sixth commandment reads, "Honor your father and your mother, so that you may live long in the land the Lord your God is giving you."¹³² The texts gives no more detail on what honoring entails, so one is left to assume the receivers of this law clearly understood the concept of honoring others.

In 2001, the concept of honoring others is rarely discussed outside the halls of churches and other religious gathering. At one time, honoring elders, parents and those who have gone before one was commonplace. Presently society does not spend a good deal of energy emphasizing this concept. If the Army were to implement this concept, it would have to be taught. Dr. Chapman views this quality as an integral part of a functional family environment. If the Army wants functional relationships, it may need to pursue a new emphasis on honoring those who are senior to us.

As adults, junior leaders have their own opinions on honoring. However, the model of the senior leaders can be very powerful. A senior leader's respect for authority and patterns are modeled to the junior officers. What exactly is honor? "Honor is the recognition of integrity and uprightness; it shows a genuine concern for others. To honor someone is to draw attention to that person's character."¹³³ A junior officer will genuinely respect and honor a senior officer when one believes the senior officer's actions have been truly good and consistent with the junior officers sense of right and wrong. There is also an element of

sacrifice involved in the action that motivates a junior to honor a senior. Examples are found in these words:

People of all races still honor George Washington Carver. Why? Because he lived a self-sacrificing life for the benefit of others. True honor is always earned....David Livingston was born in Scotland....Livingston was honored by Africans and Englishmen because he invested his life in fighting the slave trade, believing that bringing the Africans to faith in Christ would help end it. His life was invested in what he believed to be right, and people of two continents honored him. Sacrificial living tends to beget honor.¹³⁴

Honor is rendered in two ways. Honor is rendered if one feels the receiver deserves the honor. In situations where this is not the case, honor is rendered based on the receiver's positions. The Army's natural hierarchical structures and systems create an environment that naturally honors higher-ranking officers. Failure to render honor by a senior leader, for a perceived justifiable reason, to another senior leader, may only serve in the long run to transmit the wrong model to junior leaders. Junior leaders may not understand the senior leader's reasons and may take this as open license not to honor senior ranking leaders across the board.

A senior leader must remember their actions can easily model to others how one should treat them should one subsequently progress to a higher rank. If junior leaders hear senior leaders constantly complaining and hear spiteful and degrading comments from senior leaders about each other, the senior leaders are establishing a negative cultural norm. Additionally, junior officers will become extremely critical and will some day criticize the senior leader in the same fashion as the senior leader criticized a superior. Senior Leaders can create a less critical climate by investing more energy on praising the actions of other senior leaders above them instead of only focusing on the negative. Honoring type activities include taking people out for meals, sending cards, saying kind things about them, and presenting gifts from the organization when appropriate. Modeling these activities will teach honor to junior leaders, regardless of whether this was taught during their formative years or not. "True honor comes from the result of being honorable."¹³⁵

Senior leaders must live their lives as examples to junior leaders that are worthy of their honor. The honor that goes beyond just that of position is deeper and must be earned. A subordinate that feels a deep sense of respect for a senior officer is more motivated to obey that officer.

Obedience, from a military perspective is expected. There are consequences for disobedience, especially at the officer level. What exactly are we looking for in terms of honor and obey?

Learning obedience is, in its simplest form, learning to live by the rules. Obedience recognizes the necessity of learning to live under authority. It is a part of every healthy society, and it is an important ingredient in every functional family.¹³⁶

Lack of obedience renders a society dysfunctional. Obedience should not be viewed negatively. However, it can be abused and used by senior leaders as a means of self-satisfaction rather than the best interest of the subordinates and the organization. Used in this fashion, obedience becomes evil and produces an extremely dysfunctional organization. What can lead to disobedience? Can a leader decrease the level of friction involved in obedience? The words of General Ridgeway lead one to think so. General Ridgeway gives a fresh perspective to the combat commander that is easily applied to both peacetime and wartime situations.

Keep them [subordinates] informed of your thinking and plans. When you have the concept of an operation first in mind, consult your principal commanders without delay and get their reactions. No matter how sound the tactical plan may be, the chances of successful execution will be greatly increased if you have first secured the willing acceptance by commanders responsible for execution of the missions you plan to assign them.¹³⁷

Commanders may be contemplating the establishment of rules as part of their plans. First comes the issue of setting rules. Organizations constantly set rules. “Good rules have four characteristics: they are intentional, they are mutual, they are reasonable and they are discussed”¹³⁸ by members of the organization. Good rules should not develop out of frustration. When rules are developed, one should ask, “what is the purpose of this rule?” Rules should be thought out and leaders should avoid leaving subordinates captive to meaningless traditions.¹³⁹

Another aspect of obedience and honor deals with etiquette. “Contemporary corporate executives are hiring etiquette trainers and consultants because the social graces of contemporary employees are so greatly characterized by rudeness and crudeness.”¹⁴⁰ The use of words such as thank you and please may not come automatically anymore. The use of words of praise of others in general conversation should become habit as opposed to the exception. The sending of thank-you notes should be presented as an expression of honor to the host of the event based on the realization that the person is worthy of honor and respect, not out of a

block checking action dictated by culture. Senior Leaders should seek to emphasize proper etiquette. This is done not by excluding those not properly trained, but training those to succeed.¹⁴¹

Another challenge of rule making is the concept of unspoken rules. Junior Leaders cannot live up to standards they are not aware of. Correction for breaking unspoken rules quickly generates resentment. Senior Leaders have a responsibility to make sure subordinates understand what the rules are, especially if the leader implements rules above and beyond those found in standard military regulations. Thought and discussion with at least primary leaders in an organization may be beneficial before implementing new rules in the organization. Additionally, once a rule is set, there should be some flexibility. If a rule proves to do more harm than good, the leader should be willing to change the rule. Leaders consciously should review the rules made in their particular organization and periodically assess the impact of these rules. Then the leader is obligated to ensure all members, especially new members, clearly understand the rules.¹⁴²

Chapter three provided the reader with a blue print for functional leadership by describing the five characteristics of functional relationships. This chapter discussed techniques and interpersonal skills U.S. Army leaders can use to establish functional relationships with junior leaders within their organization and thereby foster functional leadership climates. Chapter four compares these five functional characteristics and techniques against the leadership environment described by junior leaders in 2000 to determine if the functional characteristics are present in the relationship between junior and senior leaders in the U.S. Army.

FUNCTIONALITY ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 4

This functionality analysis examines the environment of the U.S. Army officer corps in 2000, for the presence or absence of the functional characteristics. The analysis included information obtained from two different sources. One survey was entitled "Captain's Discussions." Senior leaders, in charge of the staff groups of students attending the Combined Arms Services Staff School, administered the survey to captains in the U.S. Army who were recently promoted, and had just completed their respective branch Advanced Courses in February of 2000. The second survey was administered to majors and some junior lieutenant colonels (young field grade officers) that were attending the Command and General Staff College as members of the Class of 2000 in April of 2000 and is referenced in the opening page of this monograph. Many comments in the survey administered to the field grade ranks expressed concerns on behalf of the captains and company grade officers in the junior ranks that explained why and how the captains felt the way they did. The comments were consistent in both surveys. The surveys pointed out the same concerns and perceived shortfalls of the senior leaders. Both surveys were overwhelmingly negative. There were only a handful of positive comments in each survey. The analysis of each of the functional characteristics follows.

An Attitude of Service Characteristic Analysis

Overall, an image of service does not permeate the U.S. Army officer corps; an image of success does. There does not appear to be an attitude of servant leadership demonstrated by the senior leaders. Senior officers do not appear to hold subordinates to the tenants of servant leadership. Junior leaders view the senior leaders as self-focused and self-centered. They believe that commanders are more concerned with looking good on paper, and looking good in motor pools instead of being functional and really addressing issues.¹⁴³ There is a common belief among junior leaders that the present system promotes self-focused officers.

Servant leaders should have the well being of their subordinates and organizations as their first priority. Junior officers perceive that top-down loyalty does not exist; senior leaders are too busy looking out for themselves. Many officers are characterized as being

so worried about their own careers that the survival instinct has been prevalent. Even though the Army has completed the draw down, ...many officers are so worried about their careers that they still back stab. The problem is not morale ethics like adultery; it is a lack of professional ethics, like selfless service, honesty to subordinates, and courage of their convictions.”¹⁴⁴

A few comments made by junior leaders referenced the book *Dereliction of Duty*. This book discusses the failure of the military leadership, during the Vietnam War to tell the civilian leadership the truth. Recently, the senior leadership finally admitted there were readiness problems and quality of life issues, years after soldiers mentioned it.¹⁴⁵ Junior leaders are dismayed that “no one [senior leader] appears to be falling on his sword over it.”¹⁴⁶ Junior leaders felt senior leaders allowed their benefits to erode and viewed this as a lack of interest in the welfare of the junior leaders. Junior leaders perceive there is a time for a senior leader to sacrifice one’s career when the best interests of subordinates are at stake.¹⁴⁷

The ability to sacrifice is predicated on humility. Humility is not often discussed in the military. Some junior leaders perceive there is a “do it my way” mentality.¹⁴⁸ They do not believe senior leaders value their ideas. This lack of humility is also evident in junior leaders. The world of a junior officer can be extremely critical. A person’s lofty perceptions of self will cause most humility problems. This type of person tends to have a critical spirit. Junior leaders are capable of making fun of those they perceive less capable than they are. This surely does not exhibit humility; it exhibits arrogance. Duplication of this attitude in a military environment could have devastating effects. The worth of all soldiers should be valued regardless of background and position. Everyone has something positive to contribute, unless one thinks they are better than everyone else.

Overall junior officers made a strong call for changing the promotion and assignment systems. The promotion system and the assignment system need reform. The present systems tend to foster a “punch the ticket” outlook. Many believed these selfish values are so pervasive that there “needs to be a clean sweep of senior leadership before the rest of the Army follows.”¹⁴⁹ This may be an extreme action; effective changes can be made to develop an attitude of service over success without removing all the senior leadership at the top. The U.S. Army should seek to create a system that values and promotes leaders who exhibit servant leadership qualities and humility. The analysis now will examine the characteristic of fostering trust through effective communication.

Fostering Trust Through Effective Communication Analysis

Overall, this characteristic appears to be lacking. Junior leaders distrust senior leaders and say there needs to be more like the retired Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Krulak, who answers the tough questions presented by Congress honestly. They believe the system is failing, rewards marginal performers and discourages officers from speaking out.¹⁵⁰ Some of the young field grade officers view this from a slightly different perspective. These junior officers “believe leadership makes what they feel is the right decisions for the right reasons; that rationale is not communicated; therefore perceptions form and to most ... perception is reality.”¹⁵¹ Whatever the cause, communication appears to be the potential cure.

Junior officers across the board agree that “two way communication is absent and there is a significant rift between company grade and field grade career officers.”¹⁵² Senior leaders do not take the time to talk and listen to junior leaders. Often senior leaders tend to rely on electronic mail because they are too busy to have face-to-face conversations with their subordinates. Junior officers believe this is not good and stifles interactive communications. Juniors think senior leaders should be reminded as they prepare for command that one should take time to talk and listen to officers and soldiers out of concern and not obligation.¹⁵³

The biggest issue identified was communication at every level. “Lack of communication breeds lack of trust.”¹⁵⁴ There were repetitive comments about communication shortfalls in both surveys. Many mentioned their trust was deteriorating in senior leaders because of a lack of consistent vision, poor command climates, expediency verses effectiveness, and a zero defect mentality.

Junior leaders proposed that captains and lieutenant colonels command later in their timeline so Army units benefit from their maturity. Junior leaders cited the tendency to have extremely junior battalion commanders assuming command, immediately after promotion to lieutenant colonel, as a major cause for no tolerance of mistakes. Many of the battalion commanders were promoted below the zone and tend to be inexperienced. Additionally, majors noticed that more senior captain company commanders had an easier time gaining the trust of battalion commanders because of their maturity.¹⁵⁵

The senior leaders presently are unable to foster trust among junior officers. The junior officers do not believe the senior leaders trust them. This assessment is made based on the extensive amount of micromanagement and interference demonstrated by senior leaders. They also do not trust senior leaders

because they observe that senior leaders tell them one thing and testify to Congress another. Junior leaders also feel that senior leaders continually withhold pertinent information in an effort to be politically correct. Young officers perceive there is no coherent standard for ratings and often receive no feedback from senior leaders as to why they received the ratings they did. Many times junior leaders are not sure if the ratings are really positive. On paper the words may look positive, but in a rating system where up to fifty percent can receive above center of mass ratings, and only three percent receive below center of mass ratings, a center of mass rating may prevent further advancement in the Army. This uncertainty breeds cynicism, especially in a system where one must be promoted or released from service.¹⁵⁶

Junior leaders have an extensive amount of cynicism toward any type of leadership, both civilian and military. These young officers, both captains and majors, feel that the senior leadership has “betrayed” them. Senior leaders ultimately have the responsibility to foster intellectual, emotional and social understanding with junior leaders. Presently this does not appear to be occurring. The senior leadership must take a different approach to junior leaders if establishment of trust is desired. The third functional characteristic is caring leadership. Do junior leaders perceive caring leadership is practiced?

Caring Leadership Analysis

Caring leaders create a caring environment where subordinates can grow professionally. Overall, this characteristic appeared to be lacking. A couple officers in each survey spoke up for the commander that allowed them to grow and learn from their mistakes. However, this appeared to be the exception. Many perceived there was a zero-defect environment. One mistake, miscommunication or personality conflict can cost an officer their career. Junior officers complained about a lack of mentoring early in their careers.¹⁵⁷ One comment sums up the concern “A lot of senior lieutenants leave the Army because no one mentors them or takes care of them in guiding their careers.”¹⁵⁸ The transition of the U.S. Army to a new OER and Officer Personnel Management System XXI in 1997 caused great stress on junior leaders.¹⁵⁹ This increased the level of discomfort for junior leaders and they required caring leadership to help them through.

The perception of junior leaders is that “there is an emphasis on managing verses leading. Equipment is placed at a higher priority than people.”¹⁶⁰ The mid-career officers, lieutenant colonels and majors, spoke candidly about their perceptions. They have a different perspective than the captains because a majority of

these officers have decided to remain in the Army as career officers. They believe people need to be led, not managed. One officer stated that the army “has always treated people badly-now they [do not] have to take it.”¹⁶¹ Officers are not having fun and do not have much job satisfaction.¹⁶² One officer stated “in times of uncertainty (which most would agree describes our current security environment), organizations experts from Mitzberg to Quinn to Gates suggest concentration on core strengths. There is no better time than now to focus on our Army’s core strength-it’s people.”¹⁶³ These career officers urge the senior leaders to focus on fixing the quality of life issues first before redesigning the force. All junior officers think reducing the number of Permanent Changes of Stations (PCSs) would reduce stress on families. In surveys, the assessment was made that “to understand the root of the problem, senior leaders must interface with captains directly.”¹⁶⁴

Survey results indicate that senior leaders are not taking an active leadership role by initiating exchanges. Leaders tend to be reactive. “Leader mentoring from rater to senior rater is lacking.”¹⁶⁵ “Senior leaders and general officers do not spend time mentoring and developing young officers.”¹⁶⁶ They perceive there is a “do it my way” mentality.¹⁶⁷ The new OER system, implemented in 1997, requires senior raters to conduct developmental counseling with lieutenants. Junior officers received briefings, which generated expectations of this and across the board; young officers are still not getting counseling developmentally. Despite the best intentions of senior leaders, Lieutenant General Theodore Stroup, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel reported that

over 85 percent of lieutenants report that they receive support counseling less than one week before the OER is due. What message about caring for the development of our subordinates do we send when our actions speak louder than our words?¹⁶⁸

With this in mind, junior leaders were encouraged that the Chief of Staff of the Army was coming to talk to them and they think this is critical to allowing the General to get in touch with their concerns. What type of modeling do junior officers observe?

These young officers observe middle grade officers, majors and senior leaders, working sixty to eighty hours a week in a peacetime environment, and do not understand why or desire that for their future. Juniors do not want to become like the senior officers. They want to spend time with their families. Senior leaders challenge captains to “survive” command as opposed to supporting their growth and development. Senior leaders encourage juniors to conform to “the system” but proudly tell how they succeeded by bucking the

system. According to junior leaders, senior leaders do not exhibit the values of integrity junior leaders expect. “Political correctness and cover your ass training”¹⁶⁹ appear to be the standard modeled by senior leaders and junior leaders do not respect this philosophy or think this is worthy of emulation. Senior leaders often tell the officers one thing and then they read and see them saying another to the civilian leadership on television and in the *Early Bird*.¹⁷⁰ Junior leaders perceive that senior leaders are not willing to admit that the Army is a hollow force.¹⁷¹ Leading people involves fostering an environment where junior officers are open to teaching and training. This is difficult to accomplish in an environment where junior leaders believe “senior leaders are not setting a moral and ethical example.”¹⁷² For these reasons and many more, junior leaders do not want to be like the senior leaders or desire to stay in the service long enough to become one. Another source of frustration is the perceived lack of priorities established by senior leaders.

Much precious time is spent in executing administrative functions such as attending meetings, briefings, and managing additional taskings instead of quality Army training. When time is pressured, the mentoring, professional development program and reading fall off the radar screen. Junior leaders think senior leaders need to identify an “unhealthy workaholic environment” in units and change this. Many officers mentioned frustration with the “power point army,” where long hours are spend making briefings for commanders instead of training on combat skills. Junior leaders perceive that everything is a priority and must be accomplished now. Caring leadership does not appear to be a commodity in the U.S. Army officer corps in 2000, what about teaching and training?

Teaching and Training Analysis

How effectively do senior leaders use a balance of words and actions to effectively teach and train junior officers on a daily basis? Overall, this daily effective teaching and training appears to be lacking. Effective teaching and training includes the use of words of affirmation, openness to dialogue, the modeling of values, and openness of senior leaders to questions. Do senior leaders praise junior leader efforts, short of perfection? Are senior leaders creating environments where junior leaders have the courage to take risks and experiment with new techniques?

As a whole, senior leaders who praise junior leaders are rare. The author of this monograph has had the good fortune of commanding for senior leaders who effectively teach and train. The majority of the raters

and senior raters effectively used words of affirmation and created environments where mistakes could be made and risks taken. However, the general experience of junior officers across the board is different.

The feedback from the surveys reviewed indicated a different situation across the Army. At staff meetings, seniors beat company commanders down for original ideas.¹⁷³ They believe that “being innovative will get you fired unless your results are outstanding...Forget about taking risk.”¹⁷⁴ Overall, senior leaders do not reward risk takers. They go on to say that the army talks about initiative and risk taking but then rewards officers who follow a “rigid prescribed path to success.”¹⁷⁵ Frustration occurs over the tendency to “risk assess down to nothing.”¹⁷⁶ Juniors illustrated this point by explaining that in some tactical units they trained with engineer tape instead of concertina wire, for fear that someone might get hurt. This causes tension in the relationship between junior and senior leaders.¹⁷⁷ Leaders must be willing to underwrite mistakes and take responsibility for subordinate unit actions. What are senior leaders communicating to young captains with these actions?

Captains feel like that are not valued for doing their jobs and the things they are valued for are not things they aspire to.”¹⁷⁸ Generally junior leaders believe the system rewards lack of initiative and officers do not take risks. They believe senior leaders tell them “what they want is irrelevant.”¹⁷⁹ These officers identify the field grade officers as being the worst at establishing a zero-defect, no risk, and short-term focus. Many view this as an outcome of the Army draw down executed following the Gulf War. Majors believe young officers witnessed what they perceived as unfairness during the draw down, when some senior leaders were forced to leave the Army. Many middle level leaders feel betrayed by senior leaders because they poorly manage their careers.¹⁸⁰

The future leaders of the Army do not believe their job progressions are logical and think they are being mismanaged by higher levels of the Army. They believe that their lack of quality time in critical jobs as a lieutenant, such as platoon leader or company executive officer and only twelve months of command time is not going to properly prepare them for their future responsibilities at higher levels of leadership.¹⁸¹ Junior leaders see this as betrayal by senior leaders.¹⁸² In this same light, many junior leaders perceive that they should strictly be warfighters and are disillusioned by the prospect of executing peacekeeping missions for years to come. Historically, peacekeeping missions are not really new for the U.S. Army. The author’s personal experience indicated that peacekeeping missions tend to infuse soldiers with a sense of

purpose and challenge. Perhaps this is unique to engineers or perhaps the mission of the U.S. Army is not clearly being explained to young officer recruits. The U.S. Army supports national policy first and foremost. The lack of communication on how these peacekeeping missions fit into this policy is causing great consternation. The majority of young officers appear to find peacekeeping missions frustrating because the objectives tend to be unclear, the start and end dates are never firm, and the draw down of forces in the early 1990 results in an extremely high operations tempo for the forces remaining. A negative attitude appears to permeate the junior leaders.

As a member serving in the officer corps, one is often struck by the use of offensive language at all levels from generals down to lieutenants, even in open forums. This sits in direct contradiction with the ideals of being “officers and gentlemen and ladies.” The use of foul language denotes a mind focused more on negative than positive thoughts. This negative focus imparts a negative color to the mental perspective on everything the officer says and does. The culture encourages cursing, as if to say an officer cannot command in combat unless one can curse with the best of the ranks. A wise adage warns, “but the things that come out of a mouth are a reflection of what is in the heart.”¹⁸³ Additionally, senior leaders monitoring the CGSC sensing session were amazed by consistent negative direction the talks took, despite attempts to move on to more positive issues.¹⁸⁴ Perhaps tolerance of negative offensive language and unwholesome talk contributes to the pervasive negative outlook of junior members of the officer corps. Leaders across the Army should seek to speak about issues in a more positive fashion. The final characteristic is junior leaders that honor and obey. What does the analysis of junior leaders who honor and obey reveal?

Honor and Obey Analysis

There are some serious challenges in the present environment to fostering honor and obedience from junior leaders. The motive to honor can be based on authority or based on desire because the junior officer believes the senior officer deserves it. Junior officers are capable of honoring senior officers. Examples include the esteem junior leaders hold for General Krulack and positive comments regarding other caring leaders. One element that motivates one to honor another is the living demonstration of an attitude of service. Since this attitude is not commonplace in the U.S. Army officer corps, the fostering of true honor will be difficult. All in all, junior leaders render senior leaders common courtesies as prescribed by

regulation. Analyses of their overall feelings indicate that the desire to honor is greatly stifled. Juniors, left to their own accord, have a tendency to speak negatively and cynically about leadership and leadership decisions. This observation is recorded throughout multiple surveys. What causes these feelings?

The biggest cause of problems is generated by unreasonable expectations. The U.S. Army training regulation AR 350-1 outlines the standards units must train to. Many officers perceive it is impossible to train to these standards and this leads to falsifying on reports and poor training. Units are over committed and cannot accomplish all these required training tasks to standard. The downsizing has exasperated “a too much to do with too little” situation. Doing all that is required by regulation and according to the commanders’ intent is practically impossible.

The greatest difficulties experienced by junior leaders are found in keeping up with maintenance requirements. During the draw down, maintenance personnel in unit motor pools were reduced. A calculation of the hours required to conduct all the services for equipment in accordance with regulations and the mechanic man hours available in a year at the company level, will reveal there is a shortfall. Companies simply do not have sufficient personnel to keep up with regulatory requirements and daily maintenance of equipment. The expectation of maintaining standards and the inability to accomplish the mission create moral dilemmas for young officers. Furthermore, every suspense appears to be now.¹⁸⁵ The balancing of requirements does not seem possible.

Junior leaders urge senior leaders to “conduct [a] bottom up review of the critical resources needed at the unit level to accomplish their assigned missions. They think that existing rules often create integrity dilemmas because they often prevent junior leaders from taking care of soldiers.”¹⁸⁶ Junior leaders urge senior leaders to stop saying do more with less. “Junior leaders would like senior leaders to start resourcing (dollars, bullets, equipment, people) units to fully address training and readiness.”¹⁸⁷ Juniors believe honesty, integrity and honor are lacking in the Army as a result of fixation with results and inadequate resourcing to accomplish missions and meet expected standards. Another source of frustration is a “lack of materials and the under manning of units.”¹⁸⁸ Junior leaders believe the senior leadership is out of touch with “the realities and challenges our soldiers face in the areas of training and maintenance.”¹⁸⁹ As resources decrease, standards are not adjusted. “Knowledge of resourcing shortfalls does not change the

performance expectations of brigade level commanders and their staffs.”¹⁹⁰ Reduced resources contribute to micromanagement at the field grade level.

Junior leaders view “ever increasing reporting requirements, eye wash briefings, and micromanagement as major training distracters.”¹⁹¹ Junior leaders contend that there is a poor delineation of priorities. Everything is like an unbreakable glass ball, which junior leaders must juggle and cannot drop. There is overall a lack of long term planning focus. All these factors contribute to an inability to have a long-term focus.

The intent of this functionality analysis was to view the relationship of junior and senior leaders in 2000 through the prism of the five characteristics of functionality. The author explored the environment of the junior and senior leaders to determine if these characteristics were present. Generally across the officer corps, these characteristics were not present. The relationships between junior and senior officers are therefore deemed dysfunctional overall. There are senior leaders who exhibit functional characteristics, but according to junior leaders they are rare.

The author sought simply to explore the possibilities in changes that can be made to facilitate an increased level of functionality between the officer ranks. Only functional command climates can help steer the U.S. Army officer corps through the uncertain future that stands before this nation. “It is the paradox of our times that precisely when the trust and credibility of our leaders are at their lowest, when the beleaguered survivors in leadership positions feel unable to summon up the vestiges of power left to them, we most need people who can lead.”¹⁹² The last chapter of this monograph draws conclusions and makes recommendations on how the officer corps can improve the nature of the relationship between junior and senior leaders in the future.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER 5

If an environment is dysfunctional it

does not produce greater happiness, meaning or freedom..., and it does not produce a generation with greater creativity, fewer emotional problems and more fulfillment. The opposite has been true. The experimenters fade from the scene, and the new generation is left without a compass in a vast world of unhappiness.¹⁹³

These words clearly summarize the perceptions of the young captains and majors in the U.S. Army in 2000. The environment described by the junior leaders is one in which the characteristics of functional leadership are absent. This dysfunctional leadership has created a generation of officers who “appear to be left without a compass in a vast world of unhappiness.” The thoughts and beliefs of officers surveyed in 2000 clearly indicate this vast world of unhappiness and the functionality analysis presented in the previous chapter indicated that overall the relationships between junior and senior leaders tend to be dysfunctional.

In 1996, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis Reimer, expressed concern over zero-defect attitudes, the ticket punching mentality, a lack of tolerance by senior leaders for junior leaders to make and recover from mistakes, and the abysmal state of ethical conduct. General Reimer viewed these attitudes as disturbing, but not surprising after a draw down saying

The perceptions expressed in the Army Assessment 95 are not new. The fear of delegating authority to subordinates is not a new phenomenon. The zero-defect mentality-where a commander feels his command must be error free-is not new. But we must possess the moral courage to deny this damaging philosophy that says it is worse to report a mistake than it is to make one.¹⁹⁴

After experiencing a similar experience in 1975, the Chief believed the draw down since 1989 had been difficult for the Army, hard on soldiers and their families. The Chief applauded how amazingly the Army remained trained and ready, amidst such an extensive draw down. Successful execution of missions such as Haiti, Rwanda and Somalia evidenced that the mistakes of the past were not repeated.

In 2001, the Army leadership is not in a situation that is without hope. General Reimer outlined actions that leaders can take to change this environment. The General’s recommendations were consistent with the techniques presented in this monograph and can help to establish the characteristics of functional leadership across the U.S. Army officer corps.

Overall, the relationships between junior and senior leaders are dysfunctional in 2000 because the characteristics of functional relationships are not evident as the norm, and tend to be the exception. There

are some senior leaders in the U.S. Army who exhibit functional characteristics, but based on feedback received from junior leaders, this breed of leader is rare. The problems expressed by junior leaders in this monograph are not new. Research indicated that the dysfunctional characteristics exhibited by senior leaders has been an ongoing trend since 1970 because the characteristics exhibited by senior leaders today are similar to those identified by junior and senior leaders alike, throughout this thirty-year period. The characteristics, which lead to dysfunctional relationships, actually appear to be embedded in the Army culture.

This problem has two facets to it. There are a number of problems that can be addressed simply by training leaders to be sensitive to fostering an environment of functionality. This requires conscious action and thought daily before acting and an increased emphasis in teaching about functional leadership and techniques leaders can use to attain it. Additionally, the priorities at the highest level in the Army should be more focused on ensuring senior leaders have time to spend with soldiers and counseling both positively and negatively, as opposed to the endless meetings, statistical reports and power point briefings. The frequency of briefings and status reporting should be examined and reduced. The Army presently has the technology to track more information and statistics than in the past, but a soldier ultimately must input the information. Things are effectively managed by these techniques. However, the U.S. Army's most enduring asset, the soldier, needs to be led. Discussing the three tiers of leadership development, while educational, does not get at the heart of what leaders in the Army need to be, as senior leaders. Discussion and case studies about functional techniques and human dynamics would be more beneficial in preparing senior leaders for their future command responsibilities and help leaders prioritize people over things. Implementing these techniques will improve the present leadership climate.

There are other problems that will continue until the Army decides to make a change in attitudes and procedures. These problems are in part a result of the system established presently in the military. A criticism of the system should not be viewed as an attack on the individual leaders in the system. Overall, these words appear to retain validity today. "The great bulk of the Army's leaders are intelligent, dedicated men [and women], but they are prisoners of a system that they are nearly powerless to affect."¹⁹⁵

There is much written over the last thirty years that directly attacks the character of leaders in the system. It is actually the system that reduces the effectiveness of individual leadership and character

because the system creates moral and ethical dilemmas. There are examples where local leadership can make a difference.¹⁹⁶ Local leaders can be successful, but the Army can gain the greatest success by radically altering some parts of the present personnel system. The executive summary of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report on *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century* supports the findings of this monograph and concluded:

Strong leadership, which is not uniformly in place today, is essential for maintaining the vibrant organizational climates essential for operational effectiveness in the twenty-first century. Present leader development and promotion systems, however, are not up to the task of consistently identifying and advancing highly competent leaders.¹⁹⁷

What specific parts of the system must be altered?

Techniques governing assessment of performance and potential must be altered. The OER does not appear to be an effective tool the Army can use to assess performance and potential. The OER must be redesigned to facilitate honest ratings that do not become inflated and should evaluate leaders on functional characteristics and how well they develop their subordinates. An example of a leadership evaluation focused on functionality is presented in Annex A.

There is much discussion in literature about integrating subordinate and peer evaluations as part of the OER process. The implementation of subordinate and peer evaluations, as part of the OER is not really a viable option. This tool can be used for development, but inclusion in the rating system will only suffice to add a dimension of popularity to an already complex assessment. Popularity must never be confused with leadership. Change in the system should start with identification of the true values the Army desires in senior leaders and then development of a system that rewards the demonstration of these values. Peer and subordinate evaluations seek to provide a substitute for raters and senior raters who do not really know their junior officers and the impact of their leadership on organizations. Creating a system, which facilitates greater involvement of junior leaders with senior leaders can enhance determination of potential far better than peer and subordinate evaluations. To begin with, peers and subordinates do not have the ability to see the complexity required of leadership at the higher levels of the organization. The OER is a tool to help the Army and this nation determine future leaders for the Army, not a tool used by the officer for promotion.

The new OER implemented in 1997 makes a start in the correct direction. Unfortunately, the system induces a huge center of mass population and officers continue to harbor concerns about center of mass

evaluations and their viability to survive in the up or out promotion system long enough to have a career in the U.S. Army as an officer. Some possible changes to the OER system include no ratings for lieutenants, only developmental counseling. Officers competing for promotion to field grade ranks and above will not have all the OERs in their file reviewed by the board. The promotion will be based on the officer's performance and indication of potential during key positions at their current rank. This change will eliminate the perception that one bad OER as a young officer can ruin one's career. Additionally, humility should be made an Army value, appear on the OER and those officers who exhibit arrogance will receive developmental counseling on the inconsistency of this trait with continued service as a leader in the U.S. Army.

An officer will start to receive OERs during command. If an officer is not in a primary leadership position, there will be no OER given. Instead, officers will receive performance evaluations held at the local level. The local level leadership will select company grade officers for command in their organization. Upon completion of command, the OERs will be forwarded to the Department of the Army for centrally held promotion boards for field grade ranks and higher. Promotions will be based on OERs received from primary leadership positions. Minimum times will be established for these key leadership positions, such as company command.

The concept of year groups, below the zone promotions, above the zone promotions and the rigid timelines should be eliminated. This creates a system that mass-produces officers, more as if they are things as opposed to people. The system may well have supported a mass Army with a rigid hierarchy, and centralized control requirement, but will not be effective in cultivating the team oriented, network centric structures an information age force will require. The maturity and cumulative skills of an officer will be more critical in the future.

Officers will not be considered for promotion until they complete specific prerequisites. Remaining in service at lower ranks will be acceptable. Every officer will not be expected to compete for the rank of major or lieutenant colonel or face separation from service. Not every officer will automatically receive command slots. Officers desiring to serve in these positions will put together a resume and interview for the position before a panel comprised of board members selected by the Department of the Army from the Army senior leadership and the leadership of the organization the officer desires to command in. Officers

not selected for the field grade rank will be allowed to separate from the service with a ten-year retirement investment package. Officers promoted to the rank of major may interview for branch qualifying jobs or opt to serve for fifteen years and retire with some type of package, which is transferable to a civilian career, and commensurate with the years of service rendered to the Army. The twenty years or nothing mentality should be eliminated. If the Army wants to retain quality officers, it must design a system that provides competent and competitive leaders but addresses the reality of making service in the military a viable option for one who must have a source of income for a family.

There is a natural tension in organizations.

The solution is to refocus the idea that the sum of individual benefits equals the community benefits. On an organizational level, the stress between individual and organizational level, the stress between individual and organizational values and goals is great. It has contributed to the decline in patriotism and a deterioration of trust in our social systems and our organizational and great community leaders. We need to move away from a competition of single-interests to a true community interest...The need today is for another idea or issue to galvanize Americans to a greater commitment to community than to individual self-interest.¹⁹⁸

The draw down appears to have exasperated the leadership challenges in the U.S. Army officer corps. There is a natural tendency in organizations undergoing a draw down to develop a survival syndrome. Both junior and senior leaders develop this syndrome and characteristically exhibit common concerns. Survival syndrome employees feel they cannot afford to make mistakes, they are being exploited because of the expectation to do more with less resources, leaders do not have sufficient time to interact with subordinates, counseling is insufficient, two way communication is insufficient and senior leaders expect subordinates to stand up and take it. Members of an organization who stay and survive a draw down have been impacted negatively by the experience and tend to have a greater need for affirmation. These employees question their value to the organization and senior leaders must be sensitive to this and meet these needs.¹⁹⁹ Functional leadership becomes even more imperative in this environment because it serves as a catalyst to the healing process, which individuals in the organization must undergo in order for the organization to move beyond drawdowns and the survival syndrome.

The Army, along with the rest of the military, is not alone in this reality. Dr. Delores Ambrose, conducted extensive research on the interpersonal dynamics of the downsized organization. The results of

research are enlightening and can provide understanding for senior leaders who must deal with this reality and simultaneously heal the organization, in order to move the U.S. Army forward.

Over time we (U.S. society) evolved a strong industrial culture—a way of life, a set of deeply held beliefs—that formed our approach to making a living. We came to view our work as predictable, our employers as paternalistic, and our jobs as secure. Today, (1996) as the industrial age evolves into the information age, two-thirds of U.S. workers are in the service sector. During the eighties, 46 percent of the Fortune 500 companies vanished from the list. Governments began slashing budgets and cutting employees and social programs...Across all organizations employee benefits are being cut and costs are being curtailed, along with funds for research and development and in some sectors, for new ventures. The nature of the employee/employer relationship, born in the industrial age, is being reshaped by the realities of the nineties as organizations downsize and restructure for the future.²⁰⁰

The present draw down endured by the U.S. Military should provide valuable lessons for the future. Senior leaders must honestly communicate the reality of what is going on. If an organization intends to draw down or make transformational changes in the future, the requirements should change first and then the manpower reduced.²⁰¹ The key ingredient to creating an environment that fosters obedience and honor is to have reasonable rules and regulations and requirements. The downsizing of the Army changed the size and organization of the U.S. Army. Now, *Army Transformation* and *Force XXI* impact the Army as well. The senior leadership must assess the requirements established prior to the draw down or in addition to those existing prior to the draw down and determine if meeting these requirements is reasonable with the adjusted amount of personnel, equipment and resources. The Army is presently outside of a reasonable band of tolerance in this area and must make changes if it wants to reinstate integrity and honest reporting.

A troops to task analysis must be done across the Army. Many evolutionary changes have occurred through the decade of 1990-2000. The Army underwent a draw down, implemented the digitized, computer network centric division and embarked upon a transformation for the future. The Army needs to gain control of this evolutionary change by redesigning to create an efficient force with the remaining legacy force until the objective force phases in. The Army needs to organize what is left into reasonable and manageable structures and then move on into the future. The reality is that the organization will never be the same as it was before the draw down.²⁰² Therefore, expecting to execute requirements to standards established before the draw down, with less capability, is not reasonable.

If the Army undergoes a draw down in the future, senior leaders must tell the truth and not hide information or withhold it until the last possible moment. Failure to tell it like it is can be intimidating to

subordinates. Junior leaders in 2001 will seek to develop skills to allow for survival inside and outside of the military. The mindset of the organizational man of the 1950s no longer exists. Senior leaders should not view this as a sign that junior leaders are not committed to the military. Society has a new approach. People commonly work for multiple companies during the course of a lifetime now. The Army must realign the retirement system to be consistent with this modern work environment and mentality.²⁰³

There are positive steps being taken by the Army at the turn of the century. The sensing sessions were well received by the junior officers. The establishment of the Blue Ribbon Panel is encouraging. There is a precedence to direct studies of evaluation systems and promotion systems to determine if the Army's present system can be redesigned to facilitate cooperation instead of competition.

The Army senior leadership must reexamine the rigid career paths. Stigmas normally associated with being passed over or receiving a center of mass and below center of mass rating must be removed and officers should be allowed to retire from the military with partial retirements from ten to fifteen years of service. Officers should be allowed to choose to remain at the company grade level or request promotion to the field grade level and higher. The focus of the U.S. Army officer should be on service where the nation needs the officer, not on attaining success by achieving certain ranks and statuses. The up or out approach of the present system does not facilitate an environment that fosters functional behavior and should be radically changed. In the mean time, officers can still make a difference at the local level. There is hope for officers, junior and senior, aspiring to be great leaders, even if the system is stifling.

The impact of one leader can make a difference. That hope is best gained through an application of fundamental human sensitivities and one can at least make a difference at the level one can impact.

The single most influential factor in determining morale, cohesion and organizational climate is the quality of local leadership. Absent enlightened leadership, military organizations under stress often tend to develop a dysfunctional zero-defects, rigidity that stifles effectiveness...Although one unit...had a strong sense of mission, teamwork, mutual trust, and open communication, another at the same location, with virtually identical missions and resources, had a far different climate. The quality of local leadership almost certainly explains those measurable differences.²⁰⁴

In 1985, amid the clamor of writing that cited the ills of the system, Colonel Dandridge Malone, U.S. Army (retired) wrote about a model officer one can emulate. This leader was adept at creating a command climate where the five characteristics of functionality were present. This officer may still be in the Army in 2001, serving as a senior leader. The details of this officer's accomplishments are presented in Malone's

article titled “The Subordinates.” This leader demonstrated unparalleled humility, created an attitude of service in subordinates, fostered trust through effective communication, constantly taught and trained subordinates through daily words and actions, demonstrated unprecedented caring and created an environment where obedience and honor were possible. One junior leader shared a remarkable story of what fostered the belief that “selflessness is not just a hollow word to those who are the Army’s best.”²⁰⁵

The officer wrote that the battalion commander,

dictated a letter of reprimand addressed to himself and directed that his boss’s signature block be on the letter... accepted complete responsibility for what had happened, because of the very inflexible orders that had been issued from above him...understood that it was not my fault, and ...was protecting [the junior officer] from orders that should never have been issued. [the junior officer] learned that it was a leader’s job to protect his subordinates at all costs.²⁰⁶

This is one small story of many, where an officer made an impact as a senior leader in a bureaucratic system that stifled many others. This battalion bid farewell to their commander with these words:

When we consider your legacy, sir, we have no reason for sorrow...you have left us ... a true understanding of what it is to be a soldier, a leader, a mentor and a friend...that stays forever in every officer...in the battalion. As a soldier you have always shared the hardships and dangers of your men. You have taught us the value of esprit, morale, discipline, and how to build and nurture the soldier’s will to fight and win. As a mentor, we have all benefited from your wisdom, experience, open lines of communication to make us more capable to serve...You have never betrayed our confidence or failed to lend the needed support. You trusted us. You have given us a good feeling deep down about our worth and our contribution. For what you have taught us about leadership in particular, we are forever indebted.²⁰⁷

This is functional leadership in action. It can be accomplished, even amid an environment, which appears to stifle leaders. One leader at a time can make a difference and establish a legacy of functionality for the future.

Annex A Evaluating Leadership Skills From A Functional Perspective²⁰⁸

Fundamental Truths:

- Leaders must work with the abilities they have and develop them. This is their starting point.
 - The past cannot be erased. If a determination is made that poor leadership is creating problems, the leader can assess and ask forgiveness or apologize, if appropriate. This will allow subordinates to break from the past.
 - Resentment may remain within subordinates. Commitment over the long haul is the only way to destroy the walls of resentment presently in place.
 - Leaders are not prisoners to their past. If there is a desire to change, leaders can change. Leaders can change the way they make decisions, the way they think and the way they do things. Leaders can become more effective and caring. If this is the case, here are possible steps to take to improve leadership.
1. Self-Evaluation: Evaluate present effectiveness as a caring leader. This can be intimidating but will be more beneficial than an institutionalized evaluation system because the leader is initiating it. The leader and the junior officers in the organization will rate the leader on a scale of one to ten in each category. Ten means perfection and zero means failing.
 - a. A functional leader is active in leading. The active leader will initiate and seek involvement in the junior leader's lives.
 - b. A functional leader will make time with junior leaders. How much time during the course of the week does the senior leader spend with junior leaders. Are junior leaders a priority? Is there a conscience effort to schedule quality time with junior leaders?
 - c. A functional leader is willing to put subordinates at the top of the priority list. Are people first or things and bosses? If people are first, then time and energy of the leader will reflect this.
 - d. A functional leader is committed to discovering the needs of junior leaders and subordinates. Does the leader know and understand the needs of the junior leaders from the U.S. Army's perspective and from the junior officer's perspective?
 - e. A functional leader engages junior leaders in conversation. Dialogue is critical to getting to know subordinates. Asking question about thoughts, feelings and desires and sharing the leader's thoughts, feelings and desires helps to build relationships with junior leaders.
 - f. A functional leader engages in activities with junior leaders. Does the senior leader take time to have fun with or participate in professionally developing activities with the junior leaders? What are the officers is the organization doing to have fun together and learn together? Is this done on a regular basis?
 - g. A functional leader teaches values. What are the values the senior leader holds and how is the leader teaching them to junior leaders.
 - h. A functional leader oversees the appropriate resources and opportunities for professional development of the junior leaders. The senior leader looks out for the best interest of the subordinates and the U.S. Army.
 - i. A functional leader seeks to model moral values. Is the leader living by the values? Actions have more meaning then words.
 - j. A functional leader is willing to underwrite mistakes make by junior leaders. A functional leader provides room for subordinates to learn and recover from making mistakes.
 2. Leader's Self Evaluation. A leader quickly summarizes conclusions in a paragraph.
 3. Subordinate Officer's Evaluations. The leader then asks the rest of the officers in the organization to evaluate the leader. The officer tells all involved that this is motivated by a genuine desire to develop into a better leader and an honest evaluation to the questions asked

would be appreciated. The leader can also ask those asked to give the reason for the ratings given. Specific examples would be beneficial. This will provide a vehicle in which to assess strengths and weaknesses as perceived by subordinate leaders. Additionally the senior leader can compare ratings of self with those from others to view how they compare.

4. Record conclusions from the subordinate evaluations in a paragraph.
5. Set a course for the future to improve based on lessons learned.

ENDNOTES

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- ² Ibid.
- ³ Command and General Staff College, *Chief of Staff of the Army's Leadership Survey*, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS) [database on-line] available from http://www.defense-and-society.org/FCS_Folder/leadership_comments.htm; Internet; accessed 01/24/01.
- ⁴ Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), *USAWC Key Strategic Issues List*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA, August 2000), 9.
- ⁵ Warren Bennis, *Why Leaders Can't Lead The Unconscious Conspiracy Continues* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989) 23.
- ⁶ James Autry, *Love and Profit The Art of Caring Leadership* (New York: Avon Books, 1991), 46.
- ⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3-0 Operations (DRAG Edition)*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 June 2000), 4-6 to 4-7.
- ⁸ Ibid., 1-17.
- ⁹ Ibid., 4-6 to 4-7.
- ¹⁰ Dr. Gary Chapman, *Five Signs of a Functional Family* (Chicago: Northfield Publishing, 1997), 3.
- ¹¹ Chapman, 10.
- ¹² Ibid., 8.
- ¹³ Autry, 46.
- ¹⁴ Chapman, 10.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., 7. Dr. Chapman's characteristics are slightly different but provided the intellectual stimulation, which helped the author derive the characteristics listed in this monograph.
- ¹⁶ James, Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1997), 108-109 and 111.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., 109.
- ¹⁸ Nick Kotz, Nancy Nathan, and Cathryn Donohoe "Where Have All The Warriors Gone?," *The Washingtonian*, Washington, D.C., July 1984, 85. This article contained quotes found in the 1970 Study of Military Professionalism.
- ¹⁹ Kitfield, 111.
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² USAWC, *Comprehensive Report Leadership For The 1970's; USAWC Study of Leadership For the Professional Soldier* (Carlisle Barracks, PA, 20 October 1971), 1.
- ²³ Ibid, vii.
- ²⁴ Ibid, 27.
- ²⁵ Kitfield, 109.
- ²⁶ USAWC, 34.
- ²⁷ Kitfield, 146.
- ²⁸ John Miller, Colonel, U.S. Army, "Integrity and Reality And Writing Up OERs," *Army*, Arlington, VA, April 1977, 42-44.
- ²⁹ Cincinnatus, *Self-Destruction The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army During the Vietnam Era* (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1981), 182.
- ³⁰ Ibid, 188.
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² Ibid. The old OER in Cincinnatus' time was one in which officers received numerical points. This form was numbered DA Form 67-7 and was phased out by DA Form 67-8 in 1979. With DA Form 67-7, almost every officer received the maximum number of points possible on all their OERs. Receiving one OER with a less than maximum score might result in elimination from service. The new OER provided input of narratives from a rater, intermediate rater and a senior rater. The senior rater made the critical assessment on potential by placing the officer in one of ten blocks. The rater also had a profile kept of the other officers rated in the various blocks. Eventually the new narrative OER mentioned by Cincinnatus would lose it's effectiveness at the hands of an inflation of words and block ratings in 1997. This OER brought with it the center of mass, below center of mass and above center of mass concept. A center of mass officer

was thought to be average. Officers sought to achieve a pattern of mostly above center of mass ratings. By 1997, a rating in the second block was almost unheard of and generally ended a career. In October of 1997, the DA Form 67-9 replaced the DA Form 67-8. The concept of the senior rater block check remained. Officers are still considered center of mass, above center of mass or below center of mass. Time is needed to assess the ultimate effectiveness of this new OER.

³³ Ibid., 163.

³⁴ Christopher Bassford, *The Split-Shine Syndrome Organizational Irrationality in the American Field Army* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988). Bassford served on active duty after being commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Program (ROTC). This writer served from 1981 to 1986 as a field artillery officer with tours both in Korea and Germany. Bassford's motivations for joining the Army were twofold: serving the country and as a research project. Bassford grew concerned based on his observations as serving as an officer in the U.S. Army. This is a valuable account from a junior officer's perspective. The book discusses the "critical, fatal and correctable problems" and offers a blueprint for reform.

³⁵ Richard Gabriel, *Military Incompetence* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985). This book discusses why things go wrong for the military and then proceeds to tell the stories of five operations exercised by the U.S. Military, which were viewed as failures. Gabriel is a professor of politics in a college and formerly served as a military intelligence officer and reserve major assigned to the Pentagon.

³⁶ Kotz, 80-85, 126-135. Kotz is a Pulitzer Prize winning reporter and adjunct professor at American University. Fourteen graduate students conducted countless interviews of senior leaders in the military and helped to gather research for the article.

³⁷ James Bennet, "So Many Officers, So Little to Do," *The Washington Monthly*, Washington D. C., February 1990, 22-26.

³⁸ Jeffrey Record, "Is Our Military Incompetent?," *Newsweek*, New York, NY, 22 December 1980. 9.

³⁹ William Boyd, Colonel, U.S. Army Retired, "Men of Character, Principles of Honor?," *Army*, Arlington, VA, September 1985, 22-29.

⁴⁰ Harry Ingraham, LTC, U.S. Army, "The OER Cudgel: Radical Surgery Needed," *Army*, November, 1985, 54-56. LTC Ingraham was serving as the Surgeon General's research psychology consultant. Ingraham invested significant time recruiting young officers and giving them career counseling. In time Ingraham became frustrated and this turned to grave concern. Ingraham noted that young officer started to ignore advice and felt "I was shouted down by a personnel system bellowing cynicism, distrust and fear."

⁴¹ Kotz, 83.

⁴² Ibid., 126.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 84.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 146.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 126.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Boyd, 23. The term today, in the quote refers to September of 1985.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Kotz, 128.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 130.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Benjamin Schemmer, "Internal Army Surveys Suggest Serious Concerns About Army's Senior Leaders," *Armed Forces Journal International*, Washington, D.C., August 1985, 18.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 18-20.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 18.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., 20.

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- ⁶³ Ibid.
- ⁶⁴ Beverly Harris, U.S. Army Research Institute, *Research Report 1662 Perceptions of Army Officers in a Changing Army* (Alexandria, VA, June 1994), viii-ix.
- ⁶⁵ Dennis Reimer, General, U.S. Army, "Leadership for the 21st Century: Empowerment, Environment and the Golden Rule," *Military Review* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS) [database on-line] available from <http://160.150.55.11/ACWIN98I/Reimer.htm>; Internet; accessed 07/06/00.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid.
- ⁶⁷ Rodney McCloy, Janice Laurence, and Ani DiFazio, U.S. Army Research Institute, *Study Note 96-08 Monitoring the Attitudes and Perceptions of Junior Officers: The Longitudinal Research on Officer Careers (LROC) Survey* (Alexandria, VA, July 1996), 4.
- ⁶⁸ Michael Matthews, and John Hyatt, *U.S. Army Research Institute Draft Research Report Factors Affecting the Career Decisions of Army Captains*, (Alexandria, VA, Feb 00), 7.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid., 8.
- ⁷¹ Ibid., 11-12.
- ⁷² Officer Manning, "Officer Manning For the Basic Branches" *Power Point Slide Packet Briefing Prepared for General Abrams*, (Washington, D.C., 20 Jan 2000), 24.
- ⁷³ While attending the School of Advanced Military Studies between for the Academic Year 2000-2001, an electronic mail was circulated outlining the alarmingly high number of commands turned down at the Brigade and Battalion levels. In conversation among majors and senior leaders at Fort Leavenworth, the general perception was that reduced resources and institutional stress no longer made being a battalion or brigade commander fun and enriching. Officers were more focused on taking care of their families and retiring after twenty years because an Army career was no longer of interest to them.
- ⁷⁴ Jason Whitlock, "The Family That Plays Together Wins Blowouts," *Washington Post*, 18 March 2001, D-1.
- ⁷⁵ CSU, Servant Leadership at CSU (Columbus, GA) [database on-line] available from <http://uc.colstate.edu/servant/> Internet; accessed 01/13/01.
- ⁷⁶ Robert K. Greenleaf, *Who is the servant leaders?* (Indianapolis, IN) [database on-line] available from <http://greenleaf.org/who-issl.html>; Internet; accessed 01/13/01.
- ⁷⁷ CSU, Servant Leadership at CSU (Columbus, GA) [database on-line] available from <http://uc.colstate.edu/servant/> Internet; accessed 01/13/01.
- ⁷⁸ USMA, *Values Lesson 2-4-AV Leadership and Ethics: Gus Lee Video and Discussion*, (West Point, NY) [database on-line] available from <http://www.usma.edu/Cpme/CPMEext/Educationext/EducationGuide/LPsHTML/2-4-AV.html>; Internet; accessed 01/13/01.
- ⁷⁹ Ibid.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid.
- ⁸¹ Ibid.
- ⁸² Joseph Doty, LTC, U.S. Army and Dan Gerdes, "Humility as a Leadership Attribute," *Military Review* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS) [database on-line] available from <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/SepOct00/doty.htm>; Internet; accessed 01/20/01.
- ⁸³ Chapman, 25.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid.
- ⁸⁶ Gilbert Fairholm, *Leadership and the Culture of Trust* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 101-102.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid., 102-103.
- ⁸⁸ Ibid., 103.
- ⁸⁹ Ibid., 103.
- ⁹⁰ Chapman, 49.
- ⁹¹ Dr. George Kuykendall, LTC, U.S. Army (retired) and Officer Christian Fellowship Lay Minister for the Main Post Chapel for over twenty years, taught this technique to officers in the U.S. Army. His professional training in psychology and his experience with counseling convinced him this was an effective technique. When senior leaders ask platoon leaders how they like being platoon leaders or being in the

Army, they generally will get an emotional response. Most people cannot answer this question without an emotional response. Questions like this help to break through shallow discussions and can enable the senior leader to quickly get to know the junior leader's concerns. A senior leader, who employs this technique, must be committed to listening to the answer. Leaders can clarify emotions by rephrasing them back to the junior leader. Often, if the senior leader misunderstood the junior leader, the junior leader will clarify their feelings. For example, a junior leader may say being a platoon leader is frustrating because the platoon is never manned sufficiently for critical training events. A senior leader may say back, training distracters really make training difficult. The junior leader will either say yes, they do and continue on with their perspective or say no and clarify what exactly makes training difficult. He may say the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) does not have sufficient manpower in the platoon to exercise and train on all the equipment in the platoon.

⁹² Ibid., 52.

⁹³ Hans Finzel, *The Top Ten Mistakes Leaders Make* (Colorado Springs: Victor Cook Communication, 2000), 54.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 57.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 59.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Tom Peters, "Management Excellence," *The Business Journal Chicago Tribune*, Chicago Illinois, 9 September 1991, 24.

⁹⁸ Fitzer, 62.

⁹⁹ Chapman, 26-27.

¹⁰⁰ Marvin Nickels, Colonel, U.S. Army, *Information Paper Captains Discussions* (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2000), F-13.

¹⁰¹ Anton Myrer, *Once An Eagle* (New York: Harper Collins Publisher), Jacket Cover.

¹⁰² Junior leaders recently expressed extremely negative perceptions of the senior level leadership in the U.S. Army. These comments are captured in two main documents. Marvin Nickels, Colonel, U.S. Army, *Information Paper Captains Discussions* (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2000 and Command and General Staff College, *Chief of Staff of the Army's Leadership Survey* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS) [database on-line] available from http://www.defense-and-society.org/FCS_Folder/leadership_comments.htm; Internet; accessed 01/24/01.

¹⁰³ Chapman, 100.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 102.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 103.

¹⁰⁷ Walter F. Ulmer, LTG, "U.S. Army, Leaders, Managers, and Command Climate," in *Military Leadership In Pursuit of Excellence*, ed. Robert Taylor and William E. Rosenbach (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992), 145.

¹⁰⁸ Ulmer, "U.S. Army, Leaders, Managers, and Command Climate," 145.

¹⁰⁹ Chapman, 24

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 105

¹¹¹ Ibid., 106

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid., 107

¹¹⁴ Dr. James Schneider is a professor at SAMS. In classroom discussion, Dr. Schneider passionately argues that Grant was the first commander to put all the complexities of modern warfare together and demonstrated mastery of operational art during the execution of the Overland Campaign during the Civil War.

¹¹⁵ Chapman, 111-112

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 144.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 114.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 118

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 131.

¹²⁰ Paul B. Malone III, *Love 'Em and Lead 'Em* (Annandale: Synergy Press, 1986).

- ¹²¹ Matthew B. Ridgeway, General, U.S. Army, "Leadership," in *Military Leadership In Pursuit of Excellence*, ed. Robert Taylor and William E. Rosenbach (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992), 46.
- ¹²² Chapman, 133.
- ¹²³ Autry, 21-22.
- ¹²⁴ Chapman outlines in his book templates for evaluating leadership skills. This is an unconventional approach but gets at the heart of issues that are important to the development of functional relationships. Annex A contains details of a possible evaluation of leadership skills from a functional perspective for an Army leader. This could be incorporated into developmental surveys for junior and senior leadership in the U.S. Army.
- ¹²⁵ Chapman, 151.
- ¹²⁶ Ibid., 154.
- ¹²⁷ Ridgeway, 46.
- ¹²⁸ Ibid., 156.
- ¹²⁹ Ibid.
- ¹³⁰ Ibid., 138
- ¹³¹ Clarkson Oblesby, Henry Parker, and Gregory Howell, *Productivity Improvement In Construction* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1989), 258-260.
- ¹³² Zondervan Corporation, *The NIV Compact Reference Bible* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1989), 86.
- ¹³³ Chapman, 230.
- ¹³⁴ Ibid., 231.
- ¹³⁵ Ibid., 230.
- ¹³⁶ Ibid., 205.
- ¹³⁷ Ridgeway, 52.
- ¹³⁸ Chapman, 208.
- ¹³⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 210.
- ¹⁴¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁴² Ibid., 210-211.
- ¹⁴³ Nickels, M-1.
- ¹⁴⁴ Command and General Staff College, *Chief of Staff of the Army's Leadership Survey*.
- ¹⁴⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁸ Nickels, G-1
- ¹⁴⁹ Command and General Staff College, *Chief of Staff of the Army's Leadership Survey*.
- ¹⁵⁰ Nickels, F-13.
- ¹⁵¹ Command and General Staff College, *Chief of Staff of the Army's Leadership Survey*.
- ¹⁵² Ibid.
- ¹⁵³ Nickels, G-1.
- ¹⁵⁴ Command and General Staff College, *Chief of Staff of the Army's Leadership Survey*.
- ¹⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁷ Michael Matthews, and John Hyatt, *U.S. Army Research Institute Draft Research Report Factors Affecting the Career Decisions of Army Captains* (Alexandria, VA, Feb 00), 11-12.
- ¹⁵⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁹ Officer Manning, 4.
- ¹⁶⁰ Nickels, I-1.
- ¹⁶¹ Command and General Staff College, *Chief of Staff of the Army's Leadership Survey*.
- ¹⁶² Nickels, O-1.
- ¹⁶³ Command and General Staff College, *Chief of Staff of the Army's Leadership Survey*.
- ¹⁶⁴ Nickels, G-1
- ¹⁶⁵ Ibid., G-1.

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- ¹⁶⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁶⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁶⁸ Theodore Stroup, Jr. Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, "Leadership and the Organizational Culture," *Military Review* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS) [database on-line] available from [http://@doc_exp_5555.env?CQ_SESSIONKEY=JUUBNPCJSBQD&CQDC=3&CQ_MULTI_PA\(4/16/01](http://@doc_exp_5555.env?CQ_SESSIONKEY=JUUBNPCJSBQD&CQDC=3&CQ_MULTI_PA(4/16/01); Internet; accessed 04/16/01.
- ¹⁶⁹ Nickels, C-4.
- ¹⁷⁰ Ibid., K-3.
- ¹⁷¹ Ibid., C-3.
- ¹⁷² Ibid., G-1.
- ¹⁷³ Ibid., F-9.
- ¹⁷⁴ Command and General Staff College, *Chief of Staff of the Army's Leadership Survey*.
- ¹⁷⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁷⁶ Nickels, C-2.
- ¹⁷⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁷⁸ Ibid., P-3.
- ¹⁷⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁸⁰ Command and General Staff College, *Chief of Staff of the Army's Leadership Survey*.
- ¹⁸¹ Nickels, K-1.
- ¹⁸² Ibid.
- ¹⁸³ Zondervan, 1112.
- ¹⁸⁴ Command and General Staff College, *Chief of Staff of the Army's Leadership Survey*.
- ¹⁸⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁸⁶ Nickels, K-3.
- ¹⁸⁷ Nickels, B-5
- ¹⁸⁸ Michael Matthews, and John Hyatt, *U.S. Army Research Institute Draft Research Report Factors Affecting the Career Decisions of Army Captains*, (Alexandria, VA, Feb 00), 13.
- ¹⁸⁹ Nickels, O-1.
- ¹⁹⁰ Ibid., I-1.
- ¹⁹¹ Ibid., B-1 to B-6.
- ¹⁹² Warren Bennis, *The Unconscious Conspiracy: Why Leaders Can't Lead* (New York: NMACOM, 1976), 157.
- ¹⁹³ Chapman, 10
- ¹⁹⁴ Reimer.
- ¹⁹⁵ Bassford, xv.
- ¹⁹⁶ Walter F. Ulmer Jr, *CSIS Report, American Military Culture in The Twenty-First Century* (Washington, D.C., February 2000), xxi. Additionally, one or two junior officers in a group of twenty would mention leaders who exhibited functional leadership characteristics. However, the perception of junior leaders is that this is an exception as opposed to a norm.
- ¹⁹⁷ Ulmer, *CSIS Report, American Military Culture in The Twenty-First Century*.
- ¹⁹⁸ Fairholm, 122.
- ¹⁹⁹ Delores, Ambrose, Ed.D., *Healing The Downsized Organization* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1996), 3-213.
- ²⁰⁰ Ambrose, 214-215,
- ²⁰¹ Ambrose, 195-213.
- ²⁰² Ambrose, 85.
- ²⁰³ Ambrose, 213-231.
- ²⁰⁴ Walter F. Ulmer Jr, *CSIS Report, American Military Culture in The Twenty-First Century*, (Washington, D.C., February 2000), xxi.
- ²⁰⁵ Dandridge Malone, Colonel, U.S. Army Retired, "The Subordinates," *Army*, Arlington, VA, December 1985, 16-20.
- ²⁰⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁰⁷ Malone, 24.
- ²⁰⁸ Chapman, 189.

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